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ABSTRACT 
 The modern battlefield is more complex than ever, and the technological 
advancement of weapons is accelerating. In order to win the next fight, faster response 
time to an adversary’s actions is critical. Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to 
enable warfighters to outpace enemy decision cycles and reduce information overload, 
thus overcoming the “fog of war.” When developing combat systems, reliability could be 
the difference between life and death. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that these 
weapon systems (especially novel systems such as AI) are developed with the highest 
standards of reliability and safety, long before they are introduced to the battlespace and 
entrusted to protect our nation’s warfighters. This project utilizes a Systems Engineering 
approach to identify potential hazards and risks associated with AI and its role in the 
battlespace. Using an established Risk Management Framework (RMF), the team 
provides some mitigation strategies that developers must consider as they foster this 
technology for future use in U.S. weapon systems and processes. 
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The modern battlefield is more complex than ever, and the technological 
advancement of weapons is accelerating. In order to win the next fight, a faster response 
time to an adversary’s actions is critical. Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to 
enable warfighters to outpace enemy decision cycles and reduce information overload, thus 
overcoming the “fog of war.” Some examples of possible uses of AI include integrated 
battle management aids (BMAs) that help an operator decide, algorithms that predict future 
outcomes of engagements, and identification of friend-or-foe.  
In order to employ AI effectively, developers must understand the benefits and risks 
associated with creating machines of war that can “think” like humans. Such risks are not 
limited to the technology but could also include the human dimension such as when 
warfighters distrust a computer to make decisions for them. Another example of potential 
risk is that the data that “trains” the AI could be faulty, old, or meaningless, rendering it 
ineffective. Additionally, the AI could “fail” by incorrectly choosing an action when faced 
with non-concurrence from another AI entity or BMA, resulting in threats impacting 
friendly targets. 
When developing combat systems, reliability could be the difference between life 
and death. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that these weapon systems (especially 
novel systems such as AI) are developed with the highest standards of reliability and safety, 
long before they are introduced to the battlespace and entrusted to protect our nation’s 
warfighters. This project utilized a systems engineering approach to identify potential 
hazards and risks associated with artificial intelligence and its role in the battlespace. Using 
an established Risk Management Framework (RMF), the team provides some mitigation 
strategies that developers must consider as they foster this technology for future use in U.S. 
weapon systems and processes.  
The team also employed systems engineering to conduct the project analysis. First, 
they oriented on the problem and defined requirements. To accomplish this, the team 
learned what exactly AI and machine learning (ML) are by conducting an extensive 
   
 
xvi 
literature review of prior works on the subject. This enabled the team to develop system 
architecture diagrams to understand potential system structure and hierarchy. The team 
then drew on personal knowledge from within its membership (such as two members who 
work for the Missile Defense Agency and one Active Duty Marine Officer) to develop use 
case scenarios for potential employment of AI in the battlespace. Using Innoslate to 
develop artifacts, the team then conducted a safety analysis from these use cases to identify 
hazards and failure modes. These hazards and failure modes were analyzed using the RMF 
from the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37 
Revision 2. This enabled the team to develop mitigation strategies for the identified 
hazards.  
As stated above, the team developed three use cases: (1) a ballistic missile defense 
scenario, (2) a ship under attack from a swarm of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), and 
(3) a scenario in which theater-level and strategic-level AI systems produce contradictory 
recommendations. The team chose these scenarios based on the level of impact they could 
make on the nation (such as with a ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead), their 
likelihood (such as with a high-payoff target like a large naval vessel), and the future of 
warfare shifting to an expeditionary nature (such as forward operating bases (FOBs) and 
expeditionary advanced bases). Failure modes and mitigation strategies were extensive for 
each scenario (as well as for common system hazards for computer assets). By identifying 
these failure modes and mitigation strategies, the team provides a baseline for future 
planning against other possibilities and scenarios. 
Scenario 1’s ballistic missile defense situation highlights Warfighter Mistrust. In 
this scenario, warfighters react to an incoming ballistic missile based on their own concept 
of operations, instead of what the AI recommends. The hazards associated with this 
mistrust include ineffective response time, ineffective countermeasures, incorrect lethal 
object selection, and improper location/timing of where the countermeasure will impact. 
Scenario 2’s ship self-defense situation focused on Training Data for the AI’s development. 
The team identified such hazards as misidentification and ineffective responses, along with 
failure modes associated with each. Scenario 3’s primary hazards were derived from the 
principal mishap of a successful enemy attack on a friendly FOB. The hazards that allow 
   
 
xvii 
this mishap to occur are the hostile threat not being neutralized, and whether or not it is not 
engaged at all. 
The team developed mitigation strategies for each of these scenarios. Scenario 1’s 
prime strategies were to establish time standards for the AI to adhere to in the decision-
making process, and for user concept of operations (CONOPS) to be updated regularly, as 
well as in the pre-deployment phase. For Scenario 2, proper programming techniques in 
pre-deployment, regular (monthly) updates to the training data, and utilization of back-up 
data would prevent misidentification and ineffective responses. Scenario 3’s hazards can 
be mitigated by proper programming in the pre-deployment phase with Joint forces’ input. 
In the end, the team recommends that further study take place on how to implement 
AI/ML at a Tactical and operational level, that AI/ML are used to gather performance data 
on new or existing threats, that the DOD directs how verification and validation will be 
managed for systems that will use AI/ML, and that a service level and DOD level reliability 
study for AI/ML BMAs is conducted. By the end of this report, the reader should have a 
better understanding of how AI/ML can benefit the warfighter, and what precautions must 
be taken to ensure it is developed as safely as possible. 
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Lieutenant Junior Grade Smithers sat comfortably at his desk in the Combat 
Information Center of his ship, an Arleigh Burke class Destroyer. The room was 
affectionately referred to as “Combat.” He had just earned his Surface Warfare pin, a major 
milestone in a naval officer’s career. Now that he was the youngest fully qualified officer 
on the ship, he had been assigned to the graveyard watch, but he did not mind; he enjoyed 
the peace and quiet.  
A noisy alarm and flashing lights from his screen interrupted his reverie. His 
designated Officer of the Watch master screen automatically cycled through three windows 
before it settled on an image showing the entire western Pacific.  
 




He recognized a cluster of blips as his own carrier strike group, but he did not know 
what to make of everything else. His heart raced as he tried to determine if this was a drill 
or not; there was not one scheduled for this time of night. He did not notice the hum of the 
ship’s capacitors charging.  
 
Figure 2. Sailor at Watch Station. Source: MC3 Cosmo Walrath/U.S. 
Navy. 
The window cycled itself again, highlighting a red icon, moving much faster than 
any blip should be moving, faster than any jet he was aware of. The highlighted blip was 
accompanied by a textbox identifying it as:  
Inbound Missile.  
Target: USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT (95%)  
Engage Target? 
“That can’t be right,” Smithers said aloud as he picked up the phone to the Captain’s 
quarters. He dialed the number and looked back at the screen. The blip was now 




“Don’t tell me to wait Smithers. What’s going on?!” the Captain’s disembodied 
voice barked at him through the phone. The lights dimmed and thunder clapped from the 
upper decks. Smithers’s screen now showed a new message:  
“Target destroyed - approx. 1.1NM from USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT. 
Follow-on attack imminent. Recharging HELIOS.”  
“Uhhh, sir, I think ‘George’ just shot down a cruise missile...” 
This fictional scenario illustrates one potential use of artificial intelligence (AI) in 
combat. The reader may have noted that Lieutenant Junior Grade Smithers hesitated to act 
upon the initial notification of the impending danger. The AI (referred to as ‘George’ in 
this vignette) anticipated this hesitation, and automatically powered up the ship’s onboard 
missile defense system (in this case, a LASER system known as HELIOS). The AI also 
utilized Smithers’s Officer of the Watch screen to present a simplified decision space so as 
not to overwhelm him. When Smithers exhibited a natural skepticism of the information 
presented to him, the AI made the choice to shoot down the missile when it crossed a pre-
established threshold. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The concepts of automation and AI have been around for many years. Gregory 
Allen (2020) states, “Though many AI technologies are old, there have been legitimate 
technological breakthroughs over the past ten years that have greatly increased the diversity 
of applications where AI is practical, powerful, and useful.” Machine learning (ML) is a 
subset of the field of AI and has been the focus of many research efforts recently. Figure 3 




Figure 3. Venn Diagram of Automation, AI and ML. Source: 
Johnson (2021). 
Artificial intelligence/machine learning offers the potential of improving 
warfighters’ situational awareness of the battlespace and improving the process and speed 
of tactical decision-making in time-critical and complex threat situations. The benefits will 
not come without the potential for safety risks during implementation of AI and ML.  
Figure 4 depicts some of the safety risks associated with the use of AI and ML in battle 
management aids. Automated systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, operators may 
experience trust or interaction issues, and ML systems in particular, are susceptible to 





Figure 4. Examples of Failure Modes of AI/ML Systems. Source: 
Johnson (2021) 
Artificial intelligence is becoming increasingly more attractive to the DOD as a 
capability with wide-ranging applications. According to the 2018 DOD Strategy on AI, 
“The costs of not implementing this strategy are clear. Failure to adopt AI will result in 
legacy systems irrelevant to the defense of our people, eroding cohesion among allies and 
partners, reduced access to markets that will contribute to a decline in our prosperity and 
standard of living, and growing challenges to societies that have been built upon individual 
freedoms” (DoD 2018). In particular, the air and missile defense (AAMD) mission area is 
of particular interest given the complexity in ballistic missile defense, cruise missile 
defense, hypersonic missile defense, and air defense. Multiple defense systems exist to 
defeat threats at various stages of flight controlled by human warfighters. In some 
instances, these human warfighters become overwhelmed when the decision space 
becomes complex due to time constraints, information challenges (too much, too little, or 
too faulty), or threat challenges (multiple and/or diverse AAMD threats). Including an 
automated decision aid to assist the warfighter, or even take on the role of the decision-
maker, is a domain space being explored in many parts of DOD (DoD 2018). 
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The following two operational views (OVs) depict the use of battle management 
aids with AI/ML at a strategic level (Figure 5) and a regional ⁠ level (Figure 6), along with 
embedded risk charts that identify some of the safety risks that need to be investigated. 
 





Figure 6. Regional Level OV-1 – Safety in Automated Battle 
Management Aids 
Given the high likelihood that AI and ML will be integrated into command and 
control, battle management aids, and the weapon systems themselves, this capstone project 
explored the potential hazards in introducing AI and ML capabilities as an automated battle 
management aid (BMA) for the AAMD mission. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The advancement of technology has increased the speed of warfare requiring faster 
reaction times and human decision making. The Department of Defense (2017) has 
acknowledged the necessity to acquire tactical decision aids for the purpose of alleviating 
the stress of battlefield decision making for commanders and warfighters. The use of 
automated methods, including AI and ML, in BMAs can help to meet diverse mission 
needs as well as assist with the transition from planning to execution (Department of 
Defense 2017). However, the use of AI and ML in future BMAs introduces safety risks 
and new failure modes due to the non-deterministic and evolving nature of AI systems, the 
complex human-machine interactions, and challenges related to the development and 
operation of a learning system. 
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C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the capstone project was to study the safety risks related to the 
development and implementation of future BMAs leveraging AI and ML for the AAMD 
mission. Specifically, this study addressed the following questions:  
• What are the safety risks related to the deployment of AI systems that support 
future automated tactical decision and mission planning aids? 
• What are the possible consequences of safety related problems in AI systems 
used in tactical decision making? 
D. STAKEHOLDERS 
The team identified key stakeholders and assessed their needs as shown in Table 1. 
The stakeholders include organizations and end users who will benefit from this study. End 
users (warfighters), in particular, will benefit from the implementation of successful and 
safe BMAs that leverage AI and ML capabilities. Program managers and engineers can 
incorporate the results of this study into system requirements and designs for safe AI/ML 
BMAs for the AAMD mission. 




E. TEAM ORGANIZATION 
The capstone team consisted of the following NPS systems engineering students: 
Angela Hoopes, Luis Cruz, Ryane Pappa, Savanna Shilt, and Samuel Wuornos. Table 2 
introduces the team’s roles and their respective organizations. 
Table 2. Project Team Membership 
Team Member Role Organization 
Angela Hoopes Team Leader Systems Assessment Team Lead Engineer NH-04 
0801, Missile Defense Agency - Aegis BMD 
Program Office - Engineering Directorate 




Director for Test, Israeli Cooperative Program 
Office, Missile Defense Agency 
Ryane Pappa Engineering 
Lead 
General Engineer Team Lead DB-03 0801, Systems 
Engineering Directorate, U.S. Army Combat 
Capabilities and Development Command Armaments 
Center (DEVCOM-AC) 
Savanna Shilt Lead Analyst Computer Scientist NH-03 1550, United States Army 




Lead Editor Aircraft Maintenance Officer and Pilot, Marine 
Heavy Helicopter Squadron 466, Marine Aircraft 
Group 16, 3rd Marine Air Wing, United States 
Marine Corps 
 
The Team Organizational Chart in Figure 7 describes the high-level organizational 
structure for Team A.ctual I.ntelligence that includes the roles of Capstone Advisor, Team 




Figure 7. Team Organization 
The responsibilities given to each role presented in the organizational chart were 
established based on the key studies and activities that would be completed throughout the 
course of the Capstone Project. Table 3 identifies each team member and their roles and 
responsibilities. 





F. PROJECT APPROACH 
The team utilized a systems engineering approach to conduct the analysis for this 
project. First, they oriented on the problem and defined requirements. To accomplish this, 
the team focused on learning what exactly AI and ML are by conducting an extensive 
literature review of prior works on the subject. This enabled the team to develop system 
architecture diagrams to help them understand potential system structure and hierarchy. 
The team then drew on personal knowledge from within its membership (such as two 
members who work for the Missile Defense Agency and one Active-Duty Marine Officer) 
to develop use case scenarios for potential employment of AI in the battlespace. Using 
Innoslate to develop artifacts, the team then conducted a safety analysis from these use 
cases to identify hazards and failure modes. These hazards and failure modes were then 
analyzed using the Risk Management Framework (RMF) from the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37 Revision 2. This enabled the team 
to develop mitigation strategies for the identified hazards.  
G. CAPSTONE REPORT OVERVIEW 
Chapter I provided an introduction to and background for the project. It presented 
the problem statement, project objectives, stakeholder description, team organization, and 
project approach.  
Chapter II provides a review of previous works that were researched by the team. 
These works offer key background information on machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
and warfighter decision-making. This chapter describes why these works are relevant to 
this project.  
Chapter III covers the critical analysis of three use case scenarios involving AI/ML 
in missile defense. The use cases include Ballistic Missile Defense, Naval Warship Self 
Defense, and Strategic vs Theater Bias. The chapter discusses identified failure modes and 
hazards in detail, providing a baseline for risk assessment.  
Chapter IV builds on the analysis from Chapter III and presents an in-depth risk 
analysis of the identified failure modes and hazards of each use case. The team uses this 
risk analysis to provide mitigation strategies for future developers to consider.  
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Chapter V addresses conclusions wrought from the previous chapters and discusses 
potential ways forward in the development/procurement of AI/ML with regards to missile 




II. REVIEW OF PRIOR WORKS 
A literature review was conducted to understand the various subjects related to the 
problem statement. The team reviewed articles and papers ranging from the AAMD 
mission, what is AI/ML and why is it needed, and challenges and safety risks with the 
introduction of AI/ML into a system of systems. The information provided in this chapter 
helps to align the reader with how the team framed the problem.  
A. WHAT IS AI/ML? 
The study of AI and ML is broad in scope, but it is best to start with basic 
definitions. Unfortunately, there are many definitions for both terms out there. A professor 
at Dartmouth College in 1955, John McCarthy, is known as having first defined artificial 
intelligence. McCarthy defined artificial intelligence as “The science and engineering of 
making intelligent machines” (2007, 2). Bernard Marr is a futurist and states “The focus of 
artificial intelligence shifts depending on the entity that provides the definition” (2021, 1). 
Marr provides six definitions of AI that all vary slightly. Some are provided from various 
dictionaries while others are based on companies that invest in AI and the objectives the 
company wishes to achieve. The DOD Artificial Intelligence Strategy states “AI refers to 
the ability of machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence – for 
example, recognizing patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making 
predictions, or taking action.” (2018, 5). 
DeepAI is an artificial intelligence community interested in technology 
development for the future. Their website, https://deepai.org, contains extensive amounts 
of research, news, guides and information on the field of AI. They define machine learning 
as “a field of computer science that aims to teach computers how to learn and act without 
being explicitly programmed” (2021, 1). The Berkeley School of Information describes the 
idea of machine learning as “using statistical learning and optimization methods that let 
computers analyze datasets and identify patterns” (Tamir 2021, 1). Machine learning uses 
algorithms to process large amounts of data to arrive at the next step or next decision that 
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needs to be made. The algorithm must continuously learn from the data it analyzes and 
constantly improve its output without requiring human interaction. 
The concepts of automation and artificial intelligence are often used 
interchangeably even though they are different. Wang and Siau (2019) state that 
“automation frees humans from time-consuming and repetitive tasks” (2019, 63). Ideas 
about automation typically revolve around manufacturing processes that involve 
completing the same tasks repeatedly. Automation is also seen in software with the use of 
programmed rules to complete repetitive tasks. This is where some of the confusion lies 
with the two terms. Automation can only perform repetitive tasks using a pre-programmed 
ruleset whereas AI is able to learn from patterns and apply what it has learned to new data, 
essentially mimicking human intelligence. 
There have been many improvements and use cases for AI/ML, especially over the 
last twenty years, as shown in Figure 8. Allen (2020) identifies four key factors responsible 
for improvements in ML performance as shown in Figure 9. These four factors have had a 
large impact on various use cases for machine learning that were once either almost 








Figure 9. Four Key Factors of Machine Learning. Source: Allen 
(2020).  
There are several types of acknowledged machine learning in various works. The 
more common instances are supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement learning. In 
supervised learning the data inputs are labeled according to respective data outputs prior to 
the algorithm processing any training data. Data needs to be properly labeled to ensure the 
most accurate system performance. Unsupervised learning is exactly the opposite since the 
data are not pre-labeled. Algorithms that employ unsupervised techniques can extract 
various categories or features from the data. This can be good or bad, as the data may 
extract features that were unanticipated by someone looking at the outputs. Unsupervised 
learning is a good method to initially appraise data when the relationships between data are 
not known or if the data set is too large to determine relationships. Reinforcement learning 
is a method that enables algorithms to learn from observations made in the environment. 
The algorithm takes an action which the environment responds to. The algorithm learns 
from that new environment and can take another action. This type of learning is often seen 
in digital games such as chess and various card games. 
Wang and Siau (2019) discuss AI, ML and the benefits those capabilities have had 
across various use cases. They state, “AI has enormous potential in business, 
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manufacturing, healthcare, education, military, and many other areas” (Wang and Siau 
2019, 63). They provide many real-world applications of AI shown in Table 4. There are 
many benefits to the use of AI but there are also many risks to using AI. Wang and Siau 
identify some of these risks, which are highlighted in Section C of this chapter. 
Table 4. AI Use Cases and Their Impacts. Source: Wang and Siau 
(2019). 
AI Use Case Impact on Real World 
Self-driving vehicles Fewer traffic accidents 
Education Attending class from home 
Human Resources Efficient application review/processing 
Cybersecurity Threat detection and response 
Home Automation of lights, thermostats, etc. 
Health Care Patient risk assessments 
Finance Fraud monitoring and identity theft 
 
B. HOW AI/ML COULD CHANGE THE BATTLEFIELD 
For this project, it was essential to review how the battlefield of today is changing 
and how AI/ML could be part of that change. An increasing number of sensor and weapon 
systems interact to create a common tactical picture for accurate situational awareness for 
the warfighters and commanders. This common tactical picture is created via massive 
amounts of data fusing together to output the important, and often, time-sensitive data. 
Figure 10 depicts many high-speed, simultaneous engagements and complex sensor 




Figure 10. Battlefield Complexity. Source: Johnson (2019). 
In a paper by Soller and Morrison (2008), research was done to assess battle 
managers’ performance against specific automated tasks by automated battle management 
aids. They discussed studies that were made in an “operator-in-the-loop” environment to 
determine how air and missile defense battle managers degrade with workload and how 
automation assisted the warfighter. The paper also acknowledged research done by 
Kaempf, Wolf, and Miller (1993) that studied decision making processes on Aegis cruisers 
and found that “the most difficult part of an operator’s task involved assessing the situation 
and obtaining the information needed to maintain good situational awareness vice engaging 
a threat” (Soller and Morrison 2008, 17). Engagements were binned into four basic areas: 
(1) acquisition of information, (2) representation and display of the information, (3) 
decision-making, and (4) implementation. These four areas can leverage battle 
management aids as tools to assist the warfighter. Given the complex tactical environments 
the warfighters are operating in today, AI/ML could help warfighters in all four of these 
areas by quickly gathering and processing the incoming data, displaying the important 
information needed for a decision then executing the result of that decision. 
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Johnson and Treadway state similar thoughts in their paper Artificial Intelligence – 
an Enabler of Naval Tactical Decision Superiority (2019). They state, “AI enables BMAs 
for improving combat identification, identifying and assessing tactical courses of action, 
coordinating distributed warfare resources, and incorporating predictive wargaming into 
tactical decisions” (Johnson 2019, 1). The use of AI/ML in these areas would be extremely 
powerful for the warfighters giving them the leverage they need on today’s battlefield. Two 
such programs were described in Grooms (2019) NPS Capstone titled, Artificial 
Intelligence Applications for Automated Battle Management Aids in Future Military 
Endeavors. DARPA’s decision battle management (DBM) program uses AI to improve 
situational awareness and the BAE Company was able to improve mission effectiveness 
using semi-autonomous software. The use of automated BMAs in various military missions 
today will improve the warfighter’s situational awareness and help to improve the common 
operating picture. 
Intelligence, whether human or machine, needs to use things it knows and apply 
that knowledge to learn and understand things it does not know. Johnson (2021) references 
a quote from Donald Rumsfeld regarding unknown unknowns to understand the difficulties 
with combat identification as shown in Figure 11. In Figure 12, Johnson illustrates where 
the use of various AI methods can address what is unknown. So much data is produced by 
today’s weapon systems, especially with a system of systems, that it is nearly impossible 
for humans to take that data, understand it all and provide decisions on a path forward. This 








Figure 12. AI Methods for the Knowns and Unknowns. Source: 
Johnson (2019). 
Grooms (2019) also studied the issue of combat identification and how AI/ML 
could help in this area. He interviewed five combat identification experts who possessed 
high proficiency across various tactical environments on where AI could help. Conclusions 
from his NPS Capstone concluded that the warfighters need increased situational 
awareness, testing of BMAs with warfighters in the loop, efficiency, and a user-friendly 
system, in both the ship’s equipment and reports produced onboard. Using AI/ML in these 
areas would provide great benefits to warfighters, while including their recommendations 
during system design and development would ensure the end product’s usefullness.  
Studies have also been completed in the area of human vs. AI performance. In 
another NPS Capstone by Jones et al. (2020), they analyzed scenarios involving a single 
threat. The scenarios varied the levels of stress and mixes of AI. Scenarios ranged from 
human-in-the-loop with a low stress scenario to a high stress scenario with full automation 
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and use of AI. Analysis showed that efficiencies would be achieved by incorporating higher 
levels of automation and machine learning. Jones et al. acknowledge that gains would not 
be realized in the near term, however, as it would require more refined AI methods, a large 
amount of training data to help the system learn and building of operator trust in the system 
once more automation is applied. 
Another area where AI/ML implementation would be useful is in the Operations 
Planning process. McKendrick (2017) refers to various services planning processes along 
with the Joint Operations Planning Process used by the United States and the 
Comprehensive Operations Planning Process used by NATO. She talks about how the 
capabilities to create a plan, see the plan play out, and adjust plans in a short time period 
would be of great benefit to those in the decision making process. Artificial intelligence/ 
machine learning could also help to assign assets to tasks and enable easy adaptation as 
conditions changed. Automating task monitoring for key indicators during battle would 
assist commanders in maintaining a more accurate picture of mission progress. 
Using predictive analytics as a capability to support BMA automation is another 
area that could give warfighters the leverage they need to increase their battlefield 
effectiveness. Johnson illustrates her thoughts on a predictive analytics capability using the 
conceptual framework shown in Figure 13. The idea behind this capability is that various 
courses of action are developed based on models of Blue Force and SA knowledge. Each 
course of action is evaluated using a Red Force model to assess first and second order 
effects on the enemy. Those results are then analyzed to predict the next state of action for 




Figure 13. Conceptual Framework for Predictive Analytics Capability. 
Source: Johnson (2020). 
C. CHALLENGES OF AI/ML SYSTEMS 
Introducing AI/ML into battle management aids to assist the warfighter in the 
decision-making process will be beneficial but will also present many challenges. The 
research done by this project team identified many challenges. In a paper by Dr. Bonnie 
Johnson (2021), she identifies four unique challenges. First, is that today’s warfare 
environment is very complex. The second challenge is that a large amount of training data 
is needed for the system. The third challenge she identifies are the new methods of systems 
engineering that will be required to ensure a safe system. Last, is remembering that our 
adversaries are also advancing their AI/ML capabilities. 
These four challenges encompassed much of the team’s research. The sheer number 
of weapon systems, sensors and targets provides insurmountable amounts of data to battle 
management aids with requirements for high update rates, which can overwhelm 
warfighters and combatant commanders, shrinking their decision space. Often, a human 
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operator is still in the decision-making loop, where the challenges include operator error 
and lack of warfighter trust in the decision produced by the AI/ML BMA. 
The large amount of training data needed to help the systems learn behaviors or 
outcomes must be relevant to the algorithms being used and of high quality. According to 
a discussion with the Director for Machine Learning at Chess.com, it is all about the 
training data available (Terwillinger 2021). Any program using machine learning to better 
arrive at a decision is only as good as the information provided to the program. Therein 
lies the risk to consuming bad training data that would produce less-than-favorable results 
in a game of chess, engagement of ballistic missiles, or deciding to yield to incoming 
traffic. Johnson (2020) illustrates the decisions that program managers need to make when 
developing an AI/ML enabled system in Figure 14.  
 
Figure 14. Development of Datasets for Artificial Intelligence and 
Machine Learning System Training. Source: Johnson (2021). 
All these decisions impact cost, schedule, or performance of the AI/ML system. 
The integration of AI/ML into system processes will require changes to how the system is 
engineered, especially with respect to safety. The AI/ML system will constantly learn and 
adapt to changes in data that are provided. A system engineer will have to allow for the 
system behavior to evolve while ensuring it remains safe and trustworthy for the 
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warfighters. Also, because the system learns and adapts, the system engineer must also 
understand that system failures will be unlike other past failures, and therefore will require 
more explanations.  
Johnson (2021) describes how our adversaries present challenges to the AI/ML 
system. Much of the research surrounding adversarial challenges stem from cyber-attacks 
and the ability for potential insider threats to corrupt training data fed to the system. The 
ability to outpace our adversary’s development of AI/ML capabilities and protect our 
systems from attack will be more important than ever to give the warfighters the best 
system possible.  
Wang and Siau (2019) also present their understanding of challenges and issues 
associated with AI systems. They binned these challenges into four categories as shown in 
Figure 15. Many of these challenges are not safety related but they still present an issue for 
those working to develop AI systems and provide stakeholders considerations. This project 
will address these issues as the three AAMD scenarios are investigated. 
 
Figure 15. Challenges and Issues. Source: Wang and Siau (2019). 
There has been significant progress made in identifying various failure modes 
associated with AI/ML systems. Johnson (2021) created a table of possible AI/ML failure 
modes as shown in Table 5. These failure modes can be seen in any system that 
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incorporates AI/ML. Miller and Nagy (2017) refer to the Naval Ordnance System Safety 
Activity (NOSSA) and various root causes for AI system failures that are seen. Table 6 
depicts AI System Failure root cause examples. 











Potential for failures of AI systems need to be identified early in the design process 
in order to mitigate catastrophic consequences from being a possibility. 
D. SAFETY RISK ASSESSMENT 
There are several organizations responsible for assessing the safety of weapon 
systems to include the various Program Offices and each of the military services for their 
particular programs. One such organization is Naval Ordnance Safety and Security Activity 
(NOSSA). As a field activity under NAVSEA, they are responsible for weapon system 
safety and software safety with regards to policy, procedure and design criteria (Naval Sea 
Systems Command 2021). They participate in many technical boards and panels but the 
one related to this project is the Software System Safety Technical Review Panel 
(SSSTRP). This technical review panel supports the Weapon System Explosives Safety 
Review Board (WSESRB). The objective of the SSSTRP is to provide a thorough review 
of the software control of weapon systems (Shampine 2010). The panel reviews the 
Technical Data Package provided for WSESRB review. 
The team needed to reference a couple process documents to complete the analysis 
of the three operational scenarios in this project. First, the Joint Services Software Safety 
Authorities (JS-SSA) Software System Safety Implementation Process and Tasks 
Supporting MIL-STD-882E (Implementation Guide) (2016) provided tasks and subtasks at 
the system level to ensure the proper level of rigor is used to design safe software and to 
define needed safety requirements supporting all software builds from design through test 
validation phases. Next, NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 2 (2018) outlines the 
Risk Management Framework (RMF) and provides guidance in which to apply the RMF 
process to information systems and organizations. 
Both documents include many tasks and subtasks that should be completed to 
provide for development of a safe system. The team identified tasks that were within the 
scope of this study to complete the analysis for each of three scenarios while other tasks 
were outside the scope. The first task for each scenario was to perform an in-depth hazard 
analysis which identified hazard failure modes and causes for the system. Documentation 
of the functional failure consequences would follow. Next, a safety risk assessment was 
 
29 
performed on the documented hazards. Mitigations were suggested for each of the hazards 
that could be performed to ensure a safe system.  
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information 
Technology Laboratory (ITL) is a technical leader for the nation’s measurement and 
standards infrastructure (NIST 2018). By developing such resources as tests (along with 
the methods by which they are performed), proofs of concept, references, and technical 
analysis, the NIST ITL manages the standards and guidelines for security engineering 
within federal information systems (2018). NIST’s publications provide references and 
guidelines to abide by for security and privacy for industry government, and academic 
information systems. NIST, in its partnership with the Department of Defense, the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, and the Committee on National Security Systems, 
developed the Risk Management Framework to refine security for DOD information 
systems, enhance the risk management processes, and create standardization and 
consistency among organizations (NIST 2018).  
The RMF prepares organizations to implement and execute the framework 
activities for authorization through the use of continuous tracking practices, which enables 
decision-makers to manage the risk efficiently and effectively, and implement privacy and 
security through the system development life cycle (NIST 2018). RMF execution links risk 
management process at system and organizational levels, as well as establishes 
accountability and responsibilities for the controls to be implemented within information 
systems. The RMF process ensures the software is safe from a security perspective. The 
weapon system software must be evaluated under this RMF process in order to receive an 
authority to operate (ATO). 
Figure 16 depicts the RMF process steps. The process begins with the Prepare step, 
but the remaining steps can be completed in any order. Some steps are performed at the 
organization level while others are executed at the system level. Each step has several 




Figure 16. RMF Process Steps. Source: NIST (2018). 
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Table 7. RMF Tasks. Source: NIST (2018). 
 
 
The table of tasks also depicts who has primary responsibility and supporting roles 
in completing the task. This can be a lengthy process to complete, so the entire process is 
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not part of the scope of this project. Chapter IV contains a system level risk assessment of 
the failure modes and hazard analysis done in Chapter III. 
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III. SCENARIOS, FAILURE MODES, AND HAZARD ANALYSIS 
This chapter tackles the first objective of identifying the safety risks related to the 
deployment of AI systems that support future automated tactical decision and mission 
planning aids. First, the team analyzes hazards for a generic AAMD engagement, utilizing 
the functional hierarchy. This analysis leads to three distinct use case scenarios for artificial 
intelligence / machine learning use in battle management aids, which the team evaluates 
for likely failure modes associated with each. The first use case scenario investigates trust 
deficit in an event in which ballistic missile defense (BMD) assets are on alert supporting 
a homeland defense mission. The second use case investigates the potential perils of 
training data provided to AI/ML on board a naval vessel in a ship self-defense scenario. 
The third use case explores an area defense scenario and the issues associated with the 
strategic vs. theater bias. 
The generic AAMD engagement offers a look into common safety concerns for 
computer systems and the impact to AI/ML involvement. Currently, AAMD takes place 
without AI/ML. Artificial intelligence contributes to this mission to better integrate 
capabilities, such as tasking, prioritizing threats, scalable pre-planned responses, and 
gathering data for calculating or learning. Tasking refers to the optimal, coordinated use of 
each system within the AAMD context. In a semi-automatic setting, AI advises and assists 
the warfighter (WF). Semi-autonomy can range from purely advising the WF to 
conditionally assisting/executing operations (i.e., time-sensitive situations). In an 
automatic setting, AI executes operations on its own. A fully automatic setting differs 
entirely from current CONOPS and introduces unique safety concerns. For the purposes of 
this analysis, AI involvement will be primarily focused on a semi-automatic setting, such 
as protocols between user and AI. 
The generic AAMD engagement acts as a baseline for the analysis of each AI/ML 
BMA scenario. A context diagram provides a connection between each scenario and the 
functions discussed in the generic AAMD engagement. The hazard analysis of the three 
scenarios utilizes a fault tree to identify possible failure modes. The deductive procedure 
of a fault tree analysis determines hardware failures, software failures, and human errors 
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that could cause specific mishaps within the context of the scenario, while providing 
visualization of the failure modes, hazards, and mishaps. 
A. GENERIC AAMD ENGAGEMENT 
The team used Innoslate, a model-based systems engineering (MBSE) tool, to 
model the generic AAMD engagement functions. This aids in identifying general safety 
concerns. Shown in Figure 17, a functional hierarchy narrowed down the engagement to 
four main functions: sense, communicate, engage, and kill assessment. Figure 17 is an 
initial representation of a simple AAMD engagement. The activity diagram, in Figure 18, 
represents how these four main functions interact with each other, along with general inputs 
and outputs. 
 
Figure 17. Generic AAMD Engagement Functional Hierarchy (Level 
1) 
The sense (1.1) function contains the detect, track, and identify sub functions for 
modeling simple radar functionality. Communicate (1.2) contains the functions necessary 
to support decision making. Under communicate, the output is an engagement command 
that feeds the Engage (1.3) function. The Engagement function models the simple 
subfunctions of selecting a shooter within the architecture, sending a launch command, 
then launching an interceptor (generic). Finally, the kill assessment (1.4) verifies the threat 
status for refire or engagement completion. In Innoslate, the kill assessment contains the 
“roll of the dice” based on a pre-determined probability of kill. If a kill is achieved, a kill 
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message goes out to the architecture. If an interceptor hit is not achieved, the model will 
continue shooting interceptors until the threat is killed.  
 
Figure 18. Generic AAMD Engagement Action Diagram 
Details of the four functions aid in identifying safety concerns. The associated 
subfunctions and systems facilitate characterizing the failures associated with each safety 
concern. The types, as defined in Table 8, categorize the failures by the potential causes 
for it to occur.  
Table 8. AAMD Engagement Failure Category Types 
Failure Type Definition Examples 
Operational Failure of system operation or 
system to system operation 





Incorrect/unintended error in AI/ML 
programming 
Identify hostile threat as 
non-hostile, unable to 
process multiple threats 
Adversarial 
Attack 
Direct attack or manipulation by 
adversary  
C2 network hacking, insider 





Errors with user interaction with the 
system(s) (AI interaction focused) 
Interface issues, 
interpretation error, lack of 
trust in AI/ML 
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1. AAMD Engagement – Sense  
The sense function decomposes, as seen in Figure 19, to three main subfunctions; 
detect, track, and identify. The activity diagram, in Figure 20, implies that these functions 
are done in series. Sensors detect an inbound threat, collect tracking information, and 
collect data to identify the incoming threat. Track and identify functions may be performed 
by several subsystems, in coordination with AI/ML. The AI/ML BMA processes the 
collected sensing data to actively track and identify threats. The WF monitors subsystems 
performing functions 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3. The threat indicates adversarial involvement.  
 




Figure 20. AAMD Engagement Activity Diagram – Sense 
Table 9 names seven safety concerns with their associated functions, systems, and 
failure types. Although Figure 20 only shows one inbound threat, the safety concerns 
consider the system of systems handling multiple threats. The AI/ML BMAs have the 
capacity to handle that information more effectively than the WF alone. Artificial 
intelligence also manages the tracking and identification of functions. However, that 
introduces AI/ML programming as a main failure type for the sense function. The WF 
mainly serves as a supervisor for the HMI failures. 
Adversarial attacks associated with S-6 and S-9 include direct and indirect attacks 
on systems. A direct attack physically takes out a sensor or AI/ML BMA communication 
line. Indirect attacks on AI/ML BMA involve attacks on the initial programming or ML. 
For example, an adversary sends a small swarm of non-hostile drones, in an effort to train 
ML to recognize this as a non-hostile. After some time, an adversary sends a similar swarm 
of hostiles that AI/ML BMA mistakenly marks as non-hostile, giving the hostiles a better 




Table 9. AAMD Engagement Safety Concerns – Sense 
















detections for multiple 
threats 





































S-9 Misidentify friendly 
for threat 







2. AAMD Engagement – Communicate  
The hierarchy diagram in Figure 21 contains subfunctions between AI and WF to 
develop a COA. As seen in Figure 22, function 1.2 permits a selection between an 
engagement under full automation or with the WF in the loop. Full automation simply 
allows for faster processing of the engagement while the selection of WF, in the loop, slows 
the process down – given that the WF follows a CONOPs of certain pre-planned responses. 
Alternatively, AI carries out pre-planned responses more quickly, but scalability comes 
down to the programming data. Function 1.2 generates and outputs the COA input for 




Figure 21. AAMD Engagement Hierarchy Diagram – Communicate 
 
Figure 22. AAMD Engagement Activity Diagram – Communicate 
This function relies on the WF CONOPS and AI/ML programming to develop a 
COA. As noted in Table 10, the WF and AI/ML BMA relate to the majority of the safety 
concerns. Thus, HMI and AI/ML programming become the main failure types for this 






Table 10. AAMD Engagement Safety Concerns – Communicate 





C-1 Unable to distribute 
information 





C-2 Miscalculate threat 
impact 
1.2.2, 1.2.3 AI/ML BMA AI/ML Programming 










prioritization of threats 









1.2.7 WF Operational 


















3. AAMD Engagement – Engage  
In Figure 23, function 1.3 decomposes simply to three subfunctions, engaging the 
targeted threat in accordance with the engagement output from function 1.2. The 
subfunctions follow each other in series to carry out the COA input. Within the AAMD 
systems of systems, systems communicate with each other throughout the activity diagram 
in Figure 24. The level of AI autonomy (AI and WF involvement) varies for function 1.3, 




Figure 23. AAMD Engagement Hierarchy Diagram – Engage 
 
 
Figure 24. AAMD Engagement Activity Diagram – Engage 
 
The WF or AI executes engagement subfunctions, driving the associated failure 
types (HMI and AI/ML programming) for many safety concerns in Table 11. Failures at 
this point result in direct hazards due to interceptor involvement. Therefore, the safety 





Table 11. AAMD Engagement Safety Concerns – Engage  





E-1 Selection not ready for 
launch or offline 






E-2 Prolonged interceptor 







E-3 Engagement command 
error 
































E-7 Not following 
command 
recommendation 
(possible insider threat) 




4. AAMD Engagement – Kill Assessment 
Function 1.4 follows up on the status of function 1.3. The weapon launched in 
function 1.4 needs to be tracked for threat status. A kill or miss message, in Figure 25, ends 
the initial engagement. However, a miss message triggers another engagement sequence. 
This loop is not shown in Figure 26 since refire calls for a loop of the entire engagement. 
The decomposition in Figure 25 supports attributing specific function safety concerns and 




Figure 25. AAMD Engagement Hierarchy Diagram – Kill Assessment 
 
Figure 26. AAMD Engagement Activity Diagram – Kill Assessment 
 
Function 1.4 solely relies on system operation and AI/ML programming. Artificial 
intelligence consumes the information from other systems to determine a kill. If the other 
systems operate normally, AI manages the kill assessment determination. Safety concerns 
K-3 and K-7, in Table 12, relate to HMI with the WF. This is due to message clarity 




Table 12. AAMD Engagement Safety Concerns – Kill Assessment 

































K-5 Delayed miss message 
(time sensitive situation 
for refire) 




K-6 Kill assessment loop 
takes too long for 
effective refire 














5. Common AI System Hazards 
Computer systems produce their own hazards without AI involvement. They rely 
on power sources, data consumption, user competency, and network communications. 








Table 13. Common Computer AI System Hazards 
ID Hazard AI/ML Impact 
H-1 Natural Disaster Systems unusable/destroyed; AI has limited/no 
information to consume and limited assets to negate 
threat, effective COA from AI decreases 
H-2 Power Loss Systems offline or in manual mode and unable to 
communicate directly; AI/ML unusable 
H-3 Network Related 
Adversarial Attack 
C2 network communication affected; AI/ML 
becomes untrustworthy 
H-4 System Component 
Failure 
AI programming needs to be aware of system 
component failure and calculate COA accordingly 
(may be limited or no assets to use) 
H-5 Corrupt/Incorrect Data AI/ML becomes untrustworthy 
H-6 User Error/Lack of 
Knowledge or Training 
AI/ML contribution increases in value (threat 
recognition/calculations, recommendation on COA, 
autonomy, etc.) 
H-7 Out of Date System  AI/ML outdated for optimal use; AI produces less 
effective/useful recommendations 
H-8 Insider Threat All systems at risk to be compromised; AI/ML 
becomes untrustworthy 
H-9 Weak Access Controls Security of systems at risk; escalated risk for corrupt 
system or adversarial attacks on AI/ML 
H-10 Encryption Failure Security of systems and COA at risk; escalated risk 
for adversarial attacks on AI/ML 
 
In Table 14, the team captured four key AI/ML problems from this generic AAMD 
engagement analysis. The team developed three scenarios to examine A-1, A-2, A-3 further 
for explicit failure modes. A-4 notes a generic concern which applies to all scenarios. 
Therefore, it is integrated into the failure mode analysis of each scenario instead of given 






Table 14. AAMD Scenario Hazards 
ID Scenario Concern Failure 
Type(s) 
Failure Modes 
A-1 AI/ML BMA recommendation on 
engagement differs from WF CONOPS 




See BMD Scenario 
(scenario 1) 
A-2 Threat has been mis-identified; Blue 
Forces are unaware of threat; have 
wrong information about threat; or 
confusing/conflicting information 





See Ship Self 
Defense Scenario 
(scenario 2) 
A-3 AI/ML BMAs at different Command 






See Area Defense 
Scenario (scenario 3) 
A-4 AI/ML BMA’s recommended course of 




data inputs for AI/
ML; training data 
 
B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
1. Scenario Description 
This first scenario involves the strategic mission of defending the United States 
from ballistic missile threats (particularly those armed with weapons of mass destruction 
such as nuclear payloads). Ballistic missile defense assets are on alert supporting a 
homeland defense mission. A strategic, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat is 
headed towards the continental U.S. with a suspected nuclear payload.  
As the threat missile makes its way towards its target, BMD assets sense the threat 
and begin the tracking process. These assets communicate the threat through the 
appropriate command and control ballistic missile communications (C2BMC) channels. 
Appropriate leadership is notified and through established standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), they devise a course of action (COA) to combat the threat. Simultaneously, AI 
assets within the C2BMC channels consume the information, devise a separate (though not 
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necessarily different) COA, and inject it into the solution. The WF orient on the COA and 
engage the threat by way of either the AI’s recommendation, or their own concept of 
operations (CONOPS). The context diagram in Figure 27 depicts an example of this 
engagement sequence. This scenario focuses on WF CONOPs and Strategic AI boxes and 
their influences on the GMD BMA box.  
 
Figure 27. BMD Context Diagram 
The context diagram offers an initial look at potential failure modes. This specific 
scenario is a broad look at AI/ML used as a BMA. There are many problems that could 
lead to a failure. 
2. Failure Modes and Hazard Analysis 
There are too many potential threats and failure modes to address with regards to a 
BMD scenario in this paper. The team focused the scenario analysis on the issue of 
differing engagement recommendations between AI/ML BMA and WF CONOPS/TTPs. 
Per MIL-STD-882, Rev E, failure modes are identified by tracing the primary failure paths 
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leading to a hazard, mishap, and mishap effect (DoD 2012). The main mishap effect 
concerns loss of life and assets due to the impact of the incoming threat (nuclear payload) 
and possible collateral damage from the countermeasures launched to neutralize the threat. 
The hierarchy diagram in Figure 28 depicts the potential hazards and associated failure 





Figure 28. BMD Hazard Failure Mode Tree (WF Trust Deficit) 
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Again, the focus for this scenario is the WF’s trust in AI/ML BMA and its 
recommendations on engagement. Therefore, the team needs to compare the failures 
caused by the user (WF) against the failures caused by AI/ML, to analyze the safety risks. 
As shown in Figure 28, the failure modes are categorized in this manner, for each identified 
hazard. The categorized types of these failure modes vary between AI/ML programming, 
operational, and HMI. Table 15 concludes that this scenario relies on effective cooperation 
between the systems, including the WF. 
Table 15. BMD (WF Trust Deficit) Failure Mode Summary 















HMI WF failure of time sensitive 
decision 
WF CONOPs 1.2.5 
Operational Outdated CONOPs WF CONOPs 1.2.5, 
1.2.7 
Operational Incorrect CONOPs/Training WF CONOPs 1.2.5, 
1.2.7 


























































Operational, HMI WF failure of timely protocols 










Operational, HMI Limited training WF CONOPs 1.2.5 
 
C. SHIP SELF DEFENSE 
1. Scenario Description 
This scenario describes the defense of a naval warship. During the software 
development phase, machine learning algorithms were provided a host of threats in order 
to build a Combatant Command-agnostic AI/ML BMA. This training data ranged over 
various tactical-level threats. An Aegis BMD destroyer is patrolling contested waters. 
Artificial intelligence/machine learning has observed swarms of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV) and has a model of what the threat looks like. All previous encounters have been 
non-hostile and suspected of being surveillance drones watching the ship. A much smaller 
swarm of UAV approaches the ship. Based on previous data, AI/ML does not recognize 
the swarm as a threat, and the ship is attacked.  
Figure 29 follows the generic functions for an engagement against a swarm of 
UAVs by the Aegis ship. Local and organic sensors will sense the threat complex and help 
identify the threat. Tracking and targeting data is communicated through the command and 
control systems. Given the limited training data or observed data by the AI/ML, the system 




Figure 29. Ship Self Defense Context Diagram 
2. Failure Modes and Hazard Analysis 
This scenario offers two main mishaps to discuss regarding training data: hostile 
UAVs successfully attack Aegis or Aegis launches an attack on non-hostiles. Both are 
rooted in the training data that was used to program the AI BMA and the ongoing machine 
learning programming. In a successful hostile attack, as described in the scenario, AI/ML 
BMA misidentifies the small swarm of UAVs as a non-threat and does not recommend 
engagement. Figure 30 identifies the failure modes for the misidentification of the hostile 
UAV swarm. This mishap may also be caused by an ineffective response recommended by 
AI/ML BMA, which correctly identifies the UAV swarm. This hazard is depicted in  




Figure 30. Hazard Failure Mode Tree for Incoming Hostile Attack 
(Training Data)  
On the other hand, misidentification could be the opposite; AI/ML BMA 
misidentifies a non-hostile swarm of UAVs as a threat and launches an attack. This may 
not pose an inherent safety concern. However, the launched attack on non-hostiles may 
cause follow-on enemy attacks where loss of life and/or assets becomes a higher 
probability. Figure 31 explores this concept of attacking non-hostiles and associated failure 




Figure 31. Hazard Failure Mode Tree for Attack on Non-hostiles 
(Training Data) 
This scenario focuses on training data and machine learning. Almost every 
identified failure mode involves AI/ML programming, as indicated in Table 16. 
Operational failure modes encompass errors in how AI/ML is intended to work within this 
system of systems. Adversarial attacks, in this scenario, include direct attacks to the AI 
entities but also passive attacks or manipulation of AI functions. For example, an adversary 
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purposefully sends small swarms of surveillance UAS to train the AI/ML to identify as 
non-hostile. The adversary now sends a hostile UAS swarm of comparable size/
characteristics that AI identifies as non-hostile. 
Table 16. Ship Self Defense (Training Data) Failure Mode Summary 
Failure Type(s) Failure Mode Related Entities Related 
Functions 
AI/ML Programming 
Faulty base algorithms for 
AI 
Tactical AI 
(training data) 1.2.1, 1.2.3 
AI/ML Programming 










Meaningless patterns used 
for AI/ML 







recommended by AI 











shown in Figure 
31) 1.1, 1.2.3 
AI/ML Programming, 
Adversarial Attack 
Outdated data on enemy 





AI failure to provide timely 
engagement response 







ML training data 







Prioritization of new data 
and training data for AI/
ML 








D. AREA DEFENSE 
1. Scenario Description 
This third and final scenario introduces the conflict inherent in defending two assets 
simultaneously. A mix of assets are defending an airfield, a forward-operating base housing 
friendly aircraft. PATRIOT provides point defense of the airfield while THAAD supports 
area defense of the base and local city. A G/ATOR Marine Corps radar delivers air 
surveillance. U.S. fighters defend the airspace against other hostile fighters and bombers. 
Several bomber-launched hostile cruise missiles originate from a standoff distance and are 
not detected by local sensors. Other upgraded early warning radars detect threats in the 
region and the Strategic AI informs the tactical level AI/ML/BMA of threats in the region. 
Strategic AI/BMA informs tactical BMA to negate the bomber threats, but the tactical level 
BMA non-concurs and chooses to address the cruise missile threats.  
 
Figure 32. Area Defense Context Diagram  
Strategic AI BMA involves an overall encompassing coordinated CONOPS for 
defending the airfield. The tactical level BMA represents the theater CONOPS that focuses 
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on a sub-area of interest. The context diagram, in Figure 32, includes an initial look at 
where the hazard and failure modes are rooted. For this scenario, communication is key to 
synchronizing the strategic and tactical BMAs. The addition of AI to the strategic BMA 
introduces different safety risks and associated failure modes. 
Bias can be observed when introduced into an AI/ML system at various levels. 
According to Dietterich and Kong (1995), there is a relative and absolute bias you can 
introduce into a system. If you consider a series of decision trees, a small decision tree is 
analogous to tactical level of battle where a much larger decision tree is analogous to 
strategic/operational battle space. “If these algorithms find a small tree that can correctly 
classify the training data, then a larger one is not considered” (Dietterich 2005). In this 
instance, an operational view of the battlefield may not be sufficient to inform the tactical 
level of battle. In the case of this scenario, there are competing interests that can produce 
conflicting guidance. 
2. Failure Modes and Hazard Analysis 
The hazard analysis for this final scenario focuses on one main mishap, which is a 
successful hostile attack. This scenario is unique since there are multiple incoming hostile 
threats. The mishap and mishap effect can be caused by one threat or a combination of 
threats which poses another degree of safety risks. Figure 33 establishes the associated 
hazards and failure modes. Failure modes are characterized by either a strategic AI BMA 





Figure 33. Area Defense Hazard Failure Mode Tree (Strategic vs. 
Theater Bias) 
This scenario involved mostly operational failures, related to overall 
communication. Communication plays a key role in coordinating engagements from 
strategic and tactical levels. That coordination needs to include the AI elements and the C2 
elements, each operating at the strategic level or the tactical level. The summary in  
Table 17 also indicated HMI as another main source of error – communication and 
understanding between human and machine entities. 
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Table 17. Area Defense (Strategic vs. Theater Bias) Failure Mode 
Summary 
Failure Type(s) Failure Mode Related Entities Related 
Functions 
AI/ML Programming 
Strategic AI recommends 




PATRIOT BMA 1.2.2, 1.2.6 
Operational 






Tactical C2 1.2.3, 1.2.6 
Operational 




C2BMC 1.2.2, 1.2.3 
Operational, HMI 













C2BMC 1.2.6, 1.3 
Operational, HMI 
Tactical C2 response to 
threat not communicated to 







Tactical C2 choses 




PATRIOT BMA 1.2.6, 1.3 
 
E. SAFETY ANALYSIS FROM AAMD SCENARIOS 
The three scenarios reveal several unique AI failures. Artificial intelligence aids in 
the ultimate COA for AAMD engagement. Therefore, AI failures relate to the cooperation 
in forming the COA with existing decision makers within the AAMD system of systems, 
as seen particularly in Scenarios 1 and 3. Scenario 1 covers cooperative failures between 
AI and WF. In scenario 3, AI fails at the strategic and tactical levels, individually and 
synchronously. Scenario 2 failure modes deal less with cooperation and more with the 
programming of AI/ML.  
All scenarios consider AI as a source of inefficiency or inaccuracy. The associated 
hazards depend on the scenario but ultimately attribute to the untimely responses and 
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ineffective countermeasure choice failure modes. This contributes to the distrust in AI and 
culture shift needed to accept AI. All identified failure modes hold their own risk and 
mitigation, as described in the next chapter. 
This chapter’s hazard analysis provided a few takeaways, revealed from the 
comparison shown in Table 18. The most common failure types, from the three scenarios, 
were operational and AI/ML programming. Operational failures mean that system 
operation or system to system operation caused the failure. The AI/ML programming 
means incorrect or unintended errors within AI/ML programming caused the failure. All 
identified failure modes related to communication. Within this system of systems, 
communication proves to be imperative, especially with AI involvement. Errors between 
the user and AI played a significant role as well, as seen in the HMI column of Table 18. 
HMI did not cause the most failures. However, HMI considerations should be a significant 
consideration during system development. Adversarial attacks introduced unique failure 
modes but only a few. 
Table 18. Failure Mode Comparison from AAMD Scenarios 
Failure Mode 





























































Outdated CONOPs X         X     1 
Incorrect CONOPs/
Training X         X     1 
AI failure to provide 
timely 
recommendation 
X         X   X 1 
AI failure of 
subsystem error 
detection 
X         X     1 
AI failure to provide 
timely engagement 
response 





































































X         X     3 
Untimely update to 
Strategic AI 
recommendation 
X         X   X 3 
Conflicting 
recommendations X X       X     1 
AI failure to update 
time sensitive 
recommendation 
X X       X   X 1 
AI failure of misfire 
protocol/calculation X X     X X   X 1 
Overwriting/Loss of 
AI/ML training data 
X X     X X     2 
Prioritization of new 
data and training data 
for AI/ML 
X X     X X     2 
WF delayed decision 
(conflicting 
recommendations) 
X X   X   X     1 
WF failure of timely 
protocols with AI/
ML BMA 
X     X   X     1 
Limited training X     X   X     1 
Mistrust in Strategic 
AI BMA 
recommendation 
X     X   X     3 
Insufficient protocol 
for non-concurrence 
from Tactical AI/C2 
X     X   X X   3 
Tactical C2 response 
to threat not 
communicated to 
Strategic AI BMA 

































































Tactical C2 choses 
ineffective forces to 
address threat 
X     X   X X   3 
AI failure of 
countermeasure 
calculation 
  X       X     1 
AI failure of impact 
calculation   X       X X   1 
Faulty base 
algorithms for AI   X       X     2 
Outdated data on 
enemy tactics 
  X     X X     2 
Meaningless patterns 
used for AI/ML   X     X X     2 
Ineffective 
engagement 
recommended by AI 




assignment of forces 
  X       X     3 
Training data spillage 
to enemy forces 
  X X   X X     2 
Outdated data on 
enemy forces 
(weapon impact) 
  X X     X     2 
WF failure of time 





IV. RISK ANALYSIS 
In the last chapter, the team described the potential failure modes and hazards 
associated with a generic AAMD system and three use case threat scenarios. This chapter 
describes the risk analysis of the potential failure modes of each scenario. The chapter 
begins with an overview of the risk analysis method. Next, it describes the results of the 
risk analysis for the generic AAMD system and the three use case scenarios. The chapter 
ends with a summary of the risk analysis results. 
A. RISK ANALYSIS METHOD 
NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 2 describes the Risk Management 
Framework (RMF), which provides guidelines to apply the RMF process to information 
systems and organizations (NIST 2018). According to SP 800-37,  
The RMF includes activities to prepare organizations to execute the 
framework at appropriate risk management levels. The RMF also promotes 
near real-time risk management and ongoing information system and 
common control authorization through the implementation of continuous 
monitoring processes; provides senior leaders and executives with the 
necessary information to make efficient, cost-effective, risk management 
decisions about the systems supporting their missions and business 
functions; and incorporates security and privacy into the system 
development life cycle. Executing the RMF tasks links essential risk 
management processes at the system level to risk management processes at 
the organization level. In addition, it establishes responsibility and 
accountability for the controls implemented within an organization’s 
information systems and inherited by those systems.  
The RMF is the process that all military branches use to implement privacy and 
security as well as evaluate the risks present in their information systems. The benefits of 
RMF are as follows:  
• “Provides a repeatable process designed to promote the protection of 
information and information systems commensurate with risk” (NIST 
2018, 2). 
• “Emphasizes organization-wide preparation necessary to manage 
security and privacy risks” (NIST 2018, 2). 
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• “Facilitates the categorization of information and systems, the selection, 
implementation, assessment, and monitoring of controls, and the 
authorization of information systems and common controls” (NIST 
2018, 3). 
• “Promotes the use of automation for near real-time risk management 
and ongoing system and control authorization through the 
implementation of continuous monitoring processes” (NIST 2018, 3). 
• “Encourages the use of correct and timely metrics to provide senior 
leaders and managers with the necessary information to make cost-
effective, risk-based decisions for information systems supporting their 
missions and business functions” (NIST 2018, 3). 
• “Facilitates the integration of security and privacy requirements12 and 
controls into enterprise architecture, SDLC, acquisition processes, and 
systems engineering processes” (NIST 2018, 3). 
• “Connects risk management processes at the organization and mission/
business process levels to risk management processes at the information 
system level through a senior accountable official for risk management 
and risk executive (function)” (NIST 2018, 3). 
• “Establishes responsibility and accountability for controls implemented 
within information systems and inherited by those systems” (NIST 
2018, 3). 
For these reasons, this study uses the RMF process to determine the possible 
consequences of safety related problems in AI systems used for tactical decision making. 
This chapter identifies the common risks associated with these systems and describes the 
risk assessments of this study’s three use case scenarios. The risk analysis evaluated the 
likelihood and impact of the failure modes identified in Chapter III and identified ways to 
mitigate these risks and mapped the mitigation strategies to the systems engineering life 
cycle.  
1. Risk Determination Process 
Risk determinations for each of the failure modes are plotted on a “Risk Diagram, 
also known as a Risk Matrix, [which] is used to visualize the severity of consequence 
versus probability” (SPEC Innovations 2021). The failure modes’ risks are determined by 
likelihood of occurrence and impact if the failure were to occur. Levels of likelihood and 
impact are as follows:  
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Medium Low Minor 
Medium Moderate 
Medium High Serious 
High Critical 
 
After all the risks are plotted, the overall risk for each scenario is determined. These 
definitions must be analyzed for each organization based on the security posture and nature 
of the system. The table in Figure 34 shows FIPS 199 potential impacts, which are used to 




Figure 34. Definitions of Potential Impacts. Source: NIST (2008).  
Levels of risk are typically determined using quantitative methods and risk 
determinations can be adjusted based on program risk tolerance. Due to the hypothetical 
nature of this study, failure mode risks are unquantifiable. Risks are determined to the best 
of our abilities based on years of experience with the RMF process, risk analysis, 
performing RMF validations of DOD systems, and deep tactical understanding of the three 
scenarios. Quantifiable risk analyses are recommended in the future when AI BMAs are 
developed. 
When deciding risk mitigations and where they should be implemented in the 
engineering life cycle, the DOD 5000 Model shown below in Figure 35 was used. Risk 
mitigations are assigned to be mitigated in either the Pre-Deployment or Post-Deployment 
phases of the engineering life cycle. The Pre-Deployment phase consists of concept 
refinement (CR), technology development (TD), system development and demonstration 
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(SDD), and production (PD). The Post-Deployment phase includes operations and support 
(OS). Risk mitigations will need to be analyzed in the future for each AI BMA developed.  
 
Figure 35. The New DOD 5000 Model. Source: Inflectra (2020) 
B. RISK ASSESSMENT  
1. Computer AI Systems  
Risk levels of common failure modes were determined for general Computer AI 
systems and evaluated for risk based on the likelihood and impact if the failure mode were 
to occur using the RMF Process. Failure modes of general computer AI systems were 
determined based on years of experience performing RMF analysis on numerous computer 
systems large and small. These failure modes have been visually represented on the Risk 




Figure 36. Risk Assessment Matrix - Common System Hazards 
Based on the RMF assessment, the overall risk for the common system hazards 
(explained in further detail below, including the reasoning for the likelihood and impact) 
led to the overall risk determinations. Although there is no way to completely mitigate 
risks, risk mitigation recommendations were made to help manage the risks for all failure 
modes analyzed in Figure 36. It is important to determine when these risk mitigations 
would need to be developed and implemented within the engineering life cycle, so as to be 
better prepared for future BMAs leveraging AI and ML for the AMD Mission. 
Implementation within the Engineering life cycle is also explained in detail below.  
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1. Natural Disaster 
a. Risk: Low 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood of a natural disaster is low. The impact 
would be moderate because depending on the type of natural disaster a site 
is susceptible. A Disaster Recovery plan determines how a site handles 
expected natural disasters.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Establish alternate sites and alternate equipment in case 
of a natural disaster to mitigate this risk.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment (systems 
engineering design and development) phase, the Program Management 
office needs to develop a Disaster Recovery Plan and ensure alternate sites/
alternate equipment are created. During the Post-Deployment (operational) 
phase, the sites will need to go through tabletop exercises to ensure they are 
ready in case of disaster, the Disaster Recovery Plan must be reviewed 
annually and updated as needed, and the alternate sites/equipment must 
continue to be maintained and updated.  
2. Power Loss 
a. Risk: Low 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood of power loss is medium high. The 
impact would be negligible because computer systems should account for 
this through a power reserve/fault tolerance.  
c. Risk Mitigation: This is mitigated through use of uninterruptable power 
supply (UPS), which ensures the system will continue to run for hours even 
in the case of lost power.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-deployment phase 
(concept refinement), planning for the inclusion of UPS to the system is 
needed. During the Post-Deployment phase (operations) continuous 
monitoring of the system and the UPS should occur.  
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3. Network Related Adversarial Attack 
a. Risk: Moderate 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low because most of these 
BMAs do not connect to the internet and only connect to tactical systems 
within their boundary. The impact could be critical because if the system 
were to be compromised, the enemy could control countermeasures and 
access critical data.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Ensuring proper protections are in place, including 
firewall and network protections, logs auditing all actions, not connecting 
the system to the internet, having whitelisting programs to protect the 
system against unauthorized access or modification and having physical 
access restrictions all greatly reduce this risk.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment (SDD) phase, 
network protections need to be implemented into the system. It can also be 
planned for the system to only connect to a tactical network that does not 
connect to the Internet (or not, depending on the type of system). 
Whitelisting can be implemented to ensure no unauthorized executables are 
run. During the Post-Deployment phase (OS) system admins will need to 
ensure Solidcore (or other change management device) is running and 
perform regular log-audits to ensure no unauthorized access occurs. 
4. System Component Failure 
a. Risk: Moderate 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood of a component failure is medium. 
The impact would be minor because most systems have fault tolerance.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Ensuring fault tolerance and having backup system 
components readily available reduces this risk.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment phase (SDD), 
fault tolerance will need to be implemented in the design of the system. 
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5. Corrupt/Incorrect Data 
a. Risk: High 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood of corrupt or incorrect data is Medium 
high because if updates are not regularly made, data can be out of date. The 
impact is critical because if the system has corrupt data, it will not make the 
correct recommendations or may not be operational.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Regular backups and audits mitigate this risk. 
Additionally, ensuring updates are tested before implementing into the 
system ensures updates are compatible and that information is intact. 
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Post-Deployment phase (OS), 
the system must follow DOD backup policies to ensure all data is backed 
up in case of the need to restore from previous backup versions. Log audits 
should be conducted to determine where corrupt data may come from and 
testing of updates (support) should be done before implementation occurs 
after the system has been deployed. 
6. User Error/Lack of Knowledge or Training 
a. Risk: Moderate 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood of user error or lack of knowledge is 
high; humans make mistakes and training does not always occur. The 
impact is minor because the AI will be making the recommendations.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Establishing standards, regular training and automated 
processes through the AI mitigates this risk.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase (CR), 
determine standards and document for training requirements. Ensure the 
system is user friendly and automate repetitive user tasks (SDD). During 
the Post-Deployment phase, users will require training updates as the 




7. Out of Date System 
a. Risk: Low 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low with a minor impact. 
Systems are required to be updated regularly to apply the proper patches 
and updates.  
c. Risk Mitigation: Regular updates and update policies help to mitigate this 
risk.  
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase (CR), 
determine and document the system updates policy. During the Post-
Deployment phase (OS), the system administrators must abide by the 
update policy and ensure updates are implemented according to policy 
frequency and standards. 
8. Insider Threat 
a. Risk: High 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium with a critical impact. 
Insider threat is one of the most critical threats because an insider has access 
to the system. 
c. Risk Mitigation: To mitigate this risk, personnel must receive the proper 
vetting and sign acceptable use policies (AUP). Additionally, regular audits 
to monitor access and Solidcore (or other whitelisting program) must be 
implemented to block any escalated privileges or unauthorized 
modifications. 
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase (CR), 
policies for access control and personnel vetting must be determined and 
documented. The system must be developed to protect against insider threat 
through the use of whitelisting and privilege limitations by employing 
account types and passwords (SDD). During the Post-Deployment phase, 
users must go through the documented vetting process, training and sign 
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AUPs to access the system (OS). Conduct regular audits to ensure no 
unauthorized access occurs. 
9. Weak Access Controls 
a. Risk: Moderate 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium with moderate impact. The 
DOD requires limiting account privileges and account management policies 
as well as protecting physical access. 
c. Risk Mitigation: Ensure the system follows DOD standards for access 
control and having physical access protections. 
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase (CR), 
the program office must determine access control and physical security 
policies and document them. The system must be developed to implement 
access control and physical access protections. During the Post-Deployment 
phase (OS), the gaining unit must abide by the access control and physical 
security policies. 
10. Encryption Failure 
a. Risk: Low 
b. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low with a minor impact 
because most systems are programmed to try re-encrypting in the case of an 
encryption failure. 
c. Risk Mitigation: Ensure the system re-encrypts in case of encryption 
failure. 
d. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment phase (SDD), 
the system must be developed to re-encrypt in case of encryption failure. 
During the Post-Deployment phase (OS), the system administrators must 
ensure regular backups are being performed in case an encryption failure 




The Risk Mitigation Matrix in Table 20 summarizes the risk level of common 
computer system failure modes, the risk mitigations/recommendations and which part of 
the engineering life cycle the risk would be addressed. 
Table 20. Risk Mitigation – Common System Hazards 





Common System Hazards 
Natural Disaster Low -Alternate sites/Equipment SDD, OS 
 
Power Loss Low -Uninterruptable power 
supply (UPS)  
CR, PD, OS 
Network Related 
Adversarial Attack 
Moderate -Firewall protections 
-Network protections 
-Closed systems with no 




Moderate -Fault Tolerance 






-Testing updates before 
implementation 
OS 






CR, SDD, PD, 
OS 
Out of Date System Low Regular updates CR, PD, OS 








Moderate -Standards  
-Physical access protection 
CR, TD, PD, 
OS 




The overall risk of computer systems varies from one system to another based on 
mitigation strategies that are in place, their connections to other systems and the internet, 
the importance of the system and what they control as well as their availability standards. 
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The overall risk of an AI BMA will have to be determined once it is designed, and the risks 
above should be considered.  
2. Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Risk levels of each failure mode were determined for Scenario 1, which is a trust 
deficit between the operator and the AI BMA. 
 
Figure 37. Risk Assessment Matrix – Scenario 1 
 
76 
Based on the assessment, the overall risk for the systems hazards in Scenario 1 are 
as follows:  
1. Ineffective Response Time – User Failure 
a. Failure of time sensitive decision 
i. Risk: High  
ii. Risk Determination: In this scenario, leadership comes up with a 
different solution than the AI so the likelihood of not providing a 
time sensitive decision is high. The impact is critical because if a 
decision is not made in a timely manner, life and assets are at stake.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Establish user training and standards to ensure 
leadership makes the most informed decisions. Distributing up to 
date CONOPS and related AI BMA tactical policies to personnel 
will help ensure decisions of both the humans and AI correlate. 
Devising a required reaction time will aid in ensuring action. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase 
(CR) training and time standards need to be established as well as a 
CONOPS. Additionally, the system needs to be designed to 
implement the established polices. During the Post-Deployment 
phase (OS), the documented standards and CONOPS need to be 
distributed to system users and they need to receive the proper 
training. The CONOPs and system policies need to be updated at 
least annually according to DOD standards. 
b. Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA 
i. Risk: Low 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low, and the impact 
is moderate because after a certain amount of time the AI should 




iii. Risk Mitigation: Establish user training and standards to ensure the 
best and prompt decision is made. Regular updates to the CONOPS 
distributed to personnel and policies programmed in the AI BMA 
will ensure decisions of both the humans and AI correlate. Establish 
required reaction time to ensure an action is made. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, training and standards and a required reaction time must be 
determined and documented (CR, TD). The system must be 
designed to implement time standards and the proper CONOPS. 
During the Post-Deployment phase (OS), all training and standards 
information must be disseminated, and system users must be trained 
before operating the system.  
2. Ineffective Response Time – AI/ML Failure 
a. Failure to provide timely recommendation 
i. Risk: Low 
ii. Risk Determination: In this case, the AI will still make a timely 
decision so the likelihood is low, and the impact is moderate only 
because the system would wait for confirmation from the user which 
could impact appropriate reactions.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Establish a response time requirement (based on 
the system) to mitigate this risk. After the required response time 
passes, the system will update using the latest information to ensure 
the most correct recommendation is given to the user.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: For this mitigation, the system must 
implement a time requirement to wait before updating its 
recommendation to the user. This is all done during the Pre-
Deployment phase (TD). 
b. Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
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i. Risk: Low 
ii. Risk Determination: In this situation, the AI makes an initial 
timely recommendation but the time in which the decision must be 
made passes and the AI must update the recommendation for 
engagement since the original is no longer the best option, but the 
AI fails to notify the user of the updated recommendation. The 
likelihood is low because the AI should be programmed to 
continually update and notify of the best recommendation. The 
impact is serious since an outdated recommendation puts life/assets 
at risk.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: A response time standard where the user must 
respond within the time allowed must be implemented. If this time 
passes with no response the system needs to update and notify the 
user of the new best recommendation. Continual updates and alerts 
help to negate this risk, but time is the biggest factor for risk in this 
failure mode.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, response time standards must be identified (CR), and the 
system must be designed and implemented to update to the best 
recommendation once the allowed time for user response has 
passed. During the Post-Deployment phase, the system needs to 
continually update with the latest information (OS). 
3. Ineffective Countermeasure – User Failure 
a. Conflicting recommendations 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium high since the user 
and the system might not be following the same process for 
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determining the best COA. Impact is critical because if the user does 
not trust the AI the wrong decision may be made.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: The CONOPS must be updated at least annually 
according to DOD standards. Additionally, ensuring the AI BMA is 
programmed to follow the CONOPS and is updated regularly when 
CONOPS updates are made will reduce the risk.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment phase 
(CR), the CONOPS must be developed and documented, and the 
system must be designed and implemented (SDD) to follow the 
CONOPS. During the Post-Deployment stage, the CONOPS must 
be updated at least annually (or additionally as needed)(OS), and 
users must be trained regularly and follow the most up to date 
CONOPS to help ensure similar behavior between the users and the 
AI (OS).  
4. Ineffective Countermeasure – AI/ML Failure 
a. Failure of countermeasure calculation 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low because the AI 
BMA will still make the countermeasure calculation based on the 
information it is given and based on its programming. The impact is 
serious if the AI BMA was not programmed according to the 
CONOPS, the calculation could be incorrect, and life/assets would 
be at risk.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Follow the most up to date CONOPS processes. 
Account for user’s recommendations, then make the best decision 
based on the data it has and the data given by the user.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment phase, 
the system must be designed and implemented (SDD) to follow the 
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most up to date CONOPS and account for the user’s 
recommendations. During the Post-Deployment phase, the system 
administrators would need to implement updates (OS) when updates 
to the CONOPS are made. 
b. Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium high because the 
AI BMA in this scenario might not be using the same processes as 
the leadership/user, which also makes the impact critical because 
life/assets can be a stake.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: The system must follow the most up to date 
CONOPS processes. It should also account for the user’s 
recommendations then make the best decision based on the data it 
has, and the data given by the user. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment phase 
(TD), the system must be designed and implemented to take in user 
recommendations as data to then produce the best recommendation 
given the collected data and any data the user provides. 
5. Lethal Object Selection – User Failure 
a. Outdated CONOPS 
i. Risk: Low 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is low because the DOD has a 
requirement for at least annual updates, but the impact would be 
moderate because if the CONOPS is not up to date, there is moderate 
risk.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Ensuring the CONOPS is updated at least 
annually will help to mitigate this risk.  
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iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Post-Deployment 
phase, the CONOPS must be updated at least annually or 
additionally as needed (OS). The system must be updated as the 
CONOPS is updated (OS). 
b. Limited Training 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium high because 
training processes are not always followed or implemented and the 
impact is moderate because with untrained users, there is moderate 
risk.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Ensure an onboarding process is in place for new 
personnel, ensure they are properly trained and receive annual 
refresher training / additional training as needed to reduce this risk.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, training and procedures must be determined, developed and 
documented (CR). During the Post-Deployment phase, users must 
be trained and onboarded according to policy before using the 
system (OS). Users must receive annual refresher training or 
additional training as needed according to policy (OS). 
6. Lethal Object Selection – AI/ML Failure 
a. Failure of impact calculation 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium low because the AI 
BMA will still make the countermeasure calculation based on the 
information it is given and based on its programming. The impact is 
critical if the AI BMA was not programmed according to the 
CONOPS; the calculation could be incorrect, and life/assets would 
be at risk.  
 
82 
iii. Risk Mitigation: The system must follow the most up to date 
CONOPS processes. It should also account for the user’s 
recommendations, then make the best decision based on the data it 
has and the data given by the user. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Before the system is deployed, the 
system must be designed (CR) to implement the most up to date 
CONOPS procedures and account for the user’s input to make the 
best recommendation based on collected information and user input. 
During the Post-Deployment phase, the system must be updated as 
updates to the CONOPS or algorithms are created (OS). 
b. Failure of subsystem error detection 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium, and the impact is 
serious if the system is not following the same processes as the user. 
If it does not detect an error and there is one, it can put life and assets 
in grave danger.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: The system must follow the most up to date 
CONOPS processes. It should also account for the user’s 
recommendations, then make the best decision based on the data it 
has and the data given by the user and ensure error detection is 
enabled.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, the system must be designed to implement the most up to date 
CONOPS procedures and account for the user’s input to make the 
best recommendation based on collected information and user input 
(SDD). The system must follow the most up to date algorithms to 
ensure error detection occurs (TD). During the Post-Deployment 
phase, the system must be updated as updates to the CONOPS or 
algorithms are created (OS). 
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7. Location/Timing of Countermeasure Impact – User Failure 
a. Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium high because the 
user might not make a timely decision, especially when the AI came 
up with a different solution. Failure to make a timely decision would 
make the impact serious since life/assets would be at stake.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Update the recommendation based on the latest 
information if the user does not respond within a set time standard. 
Both the user and the AI system must be using the same CONOPS 
for decisions. Additionally, ensure users are properly trained to 
make a timely decision.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment phase, 
time standards must be established (CR), and the system must be 
designed and implemented to update the recommendation if the time 
threshold for response passes (TD). During the Post-Deployment 
phase, the system must be updated with new CONOPS polices (OS), 
and users must be properly trained and be issued the most up to date 
CONOPS (OS). 
b. CONOPS/Training 
i. Risk: Medium 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium high because 
updates and training standards are not always followed, and the 
impact is moderate if the users are not trained or informed correctly. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Ensure the CONOPS is updated at least annually 
and that users are trained. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Post-Deployment 
phase, the CONOPS must be updated at least annually and 
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disseminated to users of the system. Processes must be updated on 
the system and updates must be made to user training (support). 
8. Location/Timing of Countermeasure Impact – AI/ML Failure 
a. Failure of impact calculation 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium because the system 
might not be following the same processes as the user when coming 
up with recommendations. The impact is critical because if the 
calculation is incorrect, life/assets are at risk.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: The system must be following the most up to date 
CONOPS processes. It must account for users’ recommendations, 
then make the best decision based on the data it has and the data 
given by the user.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, the system must be designed to take input from the user and 
determine the best recommendation based on the information 
collected and user input (CR, TD). During the Post-Deployment 
phase, the CONOPS must be updated and disseminated to system 
users, and the system must be updated to follow the most recent 
CONOPS (OS). 
b. Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood is medium because the system 
might not be following the same processes as the user when coming 
up with recommendations. The impact is critical because if the 
recommendation is not updated on time, life/assets are at risk. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: The system must be following the most up to date 
CONOPS processes. It should also account for users’ 
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recommendations, then make the best decision based on the data it 
has and the data given by the user. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, the system must be designed to take input from the user and 
determine the best recommendation based on the information 
collected and user input. During the Post-Deployment phase, the 
CONOPS must be updated and disseminated to system users, and 
the system must be updated to follow the most recent CONOPS. 
Although the risk levels are high for this scenario, there are mitigations that can be 
implemented for these risks to be lowered and/or mitigated. See Table 21 for mitigation 
recommendations. 
Table 21. Risk Mitigation Matrix – Scenario 1 





Ineffective Response Time – User Failure 
Failure of time 
sensitive decision 
High -User training/standards 
-Up to date CONOPS 
-Required reaction time 
CR, OS 
Failure of timely 
protocols with AI/
ML BMA 
Low -User training/standards 
-Up to date CONOPS 
-Required reaction time 
CR, TD, OS 
Ineffective Response Time – AI/ML Failure 
Failure to provide 
timely 
recommendation 
Low -Response time standards 
 
TD 
Failure to update 
time sensitive 
recommendation 
Low -Response time standards 
-Regular updates and alerts 
CR, OS 
Ineffective Countermeasure – User Failure 
Conflicting 
recommendations 
High -Annual CONOPS updates 
-Programming to ensure AI 
meets CONOPS 
CR, SDD, PD 
OS 
Ineffective Countermeasure – AI/ML Failure 
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-Allowing analysis of user 
input 
SDD, PD OS 




-Allowing analysis of user 
input 
TD, PD 
Lethal Object Selection – User Failure 
Outdated CONOPS Low -Annual updates as required 
by the DOD. 
OS 
Limited training Moderate -On boarding training 
-Annual refresher training 
CR, OS 
Lethal Object Selection – AI/ML Failure 
Failure of impact 
calculation 
Moderate -Programming 
-Allowing analysis of user 
input 






-Allowing analysis of user 
input 
 TD, SDD, PD 
OS 




High -Response time standards 
-User training 
CR, TD, OS 
CONOPS/Training Moderate -Annual updates 
-Annual refresher training 
OS 
Location/Timing of Countermeasure Impact – AI/ML Failure 
Failure of impact 
calculation 
High -Programming 
-Allowing analysis of user 
input 
 TD, SDD, PD, 
OS 




-Allowing analysis of user 
input 
TD, SDD, PD, 
OS 
 
To determine the overall risk, all risks were considered, and the average was 
determined. For this scenario, the Overall risk is Moderate. In Scenario 1- Ballistic Missile 
Defense, the failure mode with the highest risk is 1.a. Failure of time sensitive decision 
with an overall high risk and the failures modes with the lowest risks were 2.a. Failure to 
provide timely recommendation and 5.a. Outdated CONOPS with an overall risk of Low. 
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Having the highest risk, failure mode 1.a. makes it clear that the same set of standards must 
be followed by both the users and the AI system. Having up-to-date policies and systems 
as well as concordance between the AI and the users is crucial to mitigating most of the 
risks from Scenario 1. 
3. Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Risk levels of each failure mode were determined for Scenario 2 – Ship Self 
Defense Training Data in which mishaps occur from incorrect training data. 
 
Figure 38. Risk Assessment Matrix – Scenario 2 
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Based on the assessment, the overall risk for the failure modes in Scenario 2 are as 
follows:  
1. Misidentification - Training Failure  
a. Faulty base algorithms 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium low because the system would need to be fielded 
with the correct and most up to date algorithms in which the 
system would have to be programmed to prioritize the best 
algorithm to use for the threat at hand. The impact is critical 
since life/assets are at stake.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Along with programming the system to 
use proper algorithms, the algorithms and prioritization must 
be updated regularly to keep up with current and future 
threats. Updates must be made at least monthly but have the 
capability of updating more often depending on when new 
algorithms or threats are found.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Designing and 
implementing the system to use proper algorithms and 
prioritization would occur in the Pre-Deployment phase 
(TD). During Post-Deployment, the system must be updated 
regularly (OS). 
b. Outdated data on enemy tactics 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium because update processes would have to be put into 
place, and the system would have to be updated regularly in 
 
89 
the field. The impact is serious since life/assets are at stake 
with outdated information.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Updates on enemy tactics must be 
performed at least monthly or more often when updates 
emerge.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-
Deployment phase, the system must be designed to 
constantly update recommendations based on enemy 
locations and behaviors (SDD). During the Post-
Deployment phase, the system must be updated to use the 
most up to date information on enemy tactics according to 
organizational frequency (OS). 
c. Training data spillage to enemy forces 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is low 
because there would be many protection measures in place 
preventing disclosure of information to enemies. The impact 
is critical because in the case of information spillage, life/
assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: To ensure information does not get in the 
wrong hands, the system must be encrypted, have firewall 
rules in place, anti-virus and other software to prevent 
access/modification of information, and proper access 
restrictions including the vetting of users/admins and 
physical access protections.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-
Deployment phase, the system must be designed to 
implement proper protection against data spillage and to use 
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whitelisting programs (TD). Training and vetting processes 
must be determined and documented in this phase as well. 
During the Post-Deployment phase, users must be trained 
and vetted to practice good computer security and 
operational security standards (OS). 
2. Misidentification – AI/ML Failure 
a. Meaningless patterns used 
i. Risk: High  
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium high in this scenario because the system did not 
have the right data for it to make an informed decision. If 
updated information were programmed into the system, the 
likelihood would decrease. The impact is critical because 
life/assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Proper programming and updates is the 
best mitigation for this. Additionally, having a proper study 
done on friendlies would ensure the AI system can identify 
the proper behavior and determine any discrepancies.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: During the Pre-
Deployment phase, the system must be designed and 
implemented to use the best and most up to date algorithms 
to determine recommendations (TD). Studies must be 
continually conducted on friendly and enemy behaviors and 
tactics and be provided as information within the AI system 
(support). The system must be continuously updated as knew 
studies and information are found, and this would be 




b. Overwriting/Loss of training data  
i. Risk: Low 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is low in 
this scenario because the system should have backups in 
place as well as offloading of data onto a separate system for 
information backups. The impact is moderate because 
backups should still be in place but overwriting of data can 
cause unwanted recommendations. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Backups and offloading are mitigations 
for this, so in case of information loss it can be retrieved from 
backups. Additionally, no data should be overwritten unless 
disk space is an issue in which the oldest data would be 
overwritten first.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Post-
Deployment phase, system admins must ensure backups are 
being created and offloaded onto a separate system ensuring 
all data is stored properly and not lost (OS). 
c. Prioritization of new data and training data 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium low in this scenario because the system should be 
programmed to prioritize threats appropriately. If the right 
information were programmed into the system, the 
likelihood would decrease. The impact is serious because 
life/assets could be at stake if the wrong prioritization is 
used.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Proper programming will mitigate this risk 
to ensure threats are prioritized appropriately. A method for 
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determining prioritization based on threats must be created 
and implemented.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: While in Pre-Deployment 
phase, the system must be designed to implement a proper 
prioritization strategy (TD). The system must also be 
updated regularly during the Post-Deployment phase (OS). 
3. Ineffective Response – Training Failure 
a. Outdated data on enemy forces 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium because update processes would have to be put into 
place, and the system would have to be updated regularly in 
the field. The impact is serious since life/assets are at stake 
with outdated information.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Updates on enemy forces need to be made 
at least monthly or more often as new updates come about.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Updates are made during 
the Post-Deployment phase (OS). 
4. Ineffective Response – AI/ML Failure 
a. Failure to provide timely engagement response 
i. Risk: High  
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium high in this scenario because the system did not 
have the right information to make an informed and timely 




iii. Risk Mitigation: Proper programming and time standards 
for response would mitigate this risk. Time for response 
must update based proximity as well.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Time standards must be 
determined (CR) and proper programming of the AI system 
must be implemented during the Pre-Deployment phase 
(SDD). 
b. Ineffective engagement recommended 
i. Risk: High  
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is high 
in this scenario because the system did not have the correct 
data to make a correctly informed decision. If the right 
information were programmed into the system, the 
likelihood would decrease. The impact is critical because 
life/assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Proper programming and updates are the 
best mitigation for this. Additionally, having a proper study 
conducted on friendlies would ensure the AI system can 
identify the proper behaviors and determine any 
discrepancies.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Proper design (TD) and 
programming (SDD) must be implemented in the Pre-
Deployment phase. Continual studies of behaviors and 
discrepancies of both friendly and enemy forces must 
continually be done, and updates would be added during the 
Post-Deployment phase (OS). 
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The Risk Mitigation Matrix in Table 22 summarizes the risk level of each failure 
mode, the risk mitigations/recommendations and which part of the engineering life cycle 
the risk would be addressed. 
Table 22. Risk Mitigation Matrix – Scenario 2 





Misidentification - Training Failure 
Faulty base 
algorithms 
Moderate -Ensure proper algorithms 
used 
-Ensure most up to date 
algorithms used 
TD, OS 
Outdated data on 
enemy tactics 
Moderate -Updates monthly/as needed  SDD, OS 
Training data 





TD, PD, OS 
Misidentification – AI/ML Failure 
Meaningless 
patterns used 
High -Programming to use proper 
algorithms 
TD, PD, OS 
Overwriting/Loss 





new data and 
training data 
Moderate -Programming to properly 
prioritize 
TD, PD, OS 
Ineffective Response – Training Failure 
Outdated data on 
enemy forces 
Moderate -Updates monthly/as needed OS 
Ineffective Response – AI/ML Failure 
Failure to provide 
timely engagement 
response 




High -Programming of proper 
algorithms and prioritization 
TD, SDD, PD, 
OS 
 
To determine the overall risk, all risks were considered, and the average was 
determined. For this scenario, the Overall risk is High. In Scenario 2- Ship Self Defense 
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Training Data, the failure mode with the highest risk is 4.b., Ineffective engagement 
recommended with an overall high risk and the failure mode with the lowest risk was 2.b., 
Overwriting/loss of training data with an overall risk of Low. Having the highest risk, 
failure mode 4.b makes it clear the importance of the development and design phase of the 
AI BMA. The system must be programmed with the right information to make the most 
accurate recommendation. In Scenario 2, much of the risk can be reduced with proper 
programming, studies of friendly and enemy forces, training, and updates. 
4. Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
Risk levels of each failure mode were determined for Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. 
Theater Bias in which two assets have conflicting recommendations.  
 
Figure 39. Risk Assessment Matrix – Scenario 3 
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Based on the assessment, the overall risk for the failure modes in Scenario 3 are as 
follows: 
1. Hostile Threat Not Addressed – Strategic AI BMA Failure 
a. Artificial intelligence unable to process non-concurrence 
(inflexible) 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is high 
because in this scenario, the system was not programmed to 
understand non-concurrence from other systems. The impact 
is serious because the inability to adjust to other AI systems 
and decide what the most important threat is puts life/assets 
at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: These systems must be programmed to 
work with other AI BMA systems and take information from 
multiple systems to determine the most critical threat/
prioritize actions. This is based on programming before 
deployment and updates to compatibility post-deployment 
as other AI systems are deployed. This means these systems 
must work with other systems from different branches of the 
military, meaning the programming would go through joint 
requirements.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Proper design and 
implementation would occur in the Pre-Deployment phase 
(CR). Studies and compatibility testing of AI BMA systems 
across all branches would take place in the Pre-Deployment 
phase as well (CR). These systems must be updated in the 
Post-Deployment phase to continue to be compatible with 
new and changing systems and technologies (OS). 
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b. Untimely update to recommendation 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium low because time standards would be in place to 
ensure timely recommendations are made. The impact is 
serious because life/assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Ensure the system abides time standards 
and is programmed to handle multiple recommendations, 
within the time standards. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: During the Pre-Deployment 
phase, time standards must be established and documented 
(CR). Additionally, system design and implementation to 
handle multiple recommendations would be handled in this 
phase (SDD). 
2. Hostile Threat Not Addressed – Tactical BMA Failure 
a. Mistrust in AI recommendation  
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium low because the systems would be programmed to 
work with other BMAs, accounting for all 
recommendations. The impact is critical because if the 
correct hostile threat is not addressed, life/assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: The systems must be programmed to work 
with other AI BMA systems, account for all 
recommendations and data found and then make the most 




iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: A lot of work must be done 
during the Pre-Deployment phase to ensure the system is 
designed to work with many recommendations across joint 
platforms (CR), prioritize and ensure the best overall 
recommendation is made (TD). 
b. Insufficient protocol for non-concurrence 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium high because in this scenario, the AI system was not 
programmed to take in information from other BMAs to 
make the correct decision. The impact is critical because if 
there are no protocols in place, life/assets are at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: Program the AI BMA systems with the 
proper algorithms to determine the best course of action 
based on information from all BMAs they are working with.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phase: Ensure the system is 
programmed with proper algorithms during the Pre-
Deployment phase (SDD). As updates are made, they must 
be implemented during the Post-Deployment phase (OS). 
c. Response not communicated to strategic AI BMA 
i. Risk: Moderate 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is 
medium. The impact is serious because communication 
between the BMAs is essential for protecting life and assets.  
iii. Risk Mitigation: Real-time communication must be 
implemented in these systems as well as the ability to work 
with multiple AI BMAs.  
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iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Designing the AI systems 
to communicate with each other across joint platforms must 
occur in the Pre-Deployment phase CR, TD). A conscious 
effort to update all communicating systems would be a task 
for the system administrators during Post-Deployment (OS). 
3. Hostile Threat Not Neutralized – Strategic AI BMA Failure 
a. Ineffective assignment of forces recommended 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is high 
because in this scenario, the system was not programmed to 
understand non-concurrence from other systems. The impact 
is critical because the inability to adjust to other AI systems 
and determine what the most important threat puts life/assets 
at stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: These systems must be programmed to 
work with other AI BMA systems and take information from 
multiple systems to determine the most critical threat and 
prioritize actions. This is based on programming before 
deployment and updates to compatibility post-deployment 
as other AI systems are deployed. This means these systems 
must be created to work with other systems from different 
branches of the military, meaning the programming would 
go through joint requirements.  
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Designing the AI systems 
to communicate with each other across joint platforms would 
occur in the Pre-Deployment phase (CR). A conscious effort 
to update all communication systems would be a task for the 
system administrators during Post-Deployment (OS). 
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4. Hostile Threat Not Neutralized – Tactical BMA Failure 
a. Ineffective forces chosen to address threats 
i. Risk: High 
ii. Risk Determination: The likelihood of occurrence is high 
because in this scenario, the system was not programmed to 
understand non-concurrence from other systems. The impact 
is critical because the inability to adjust to other AI systems 
and determine the most important threat puts life/assets at 
stake. 
iii. Risk Mitigation: These systems must be programmed to 
work with other AI BMA systems and take information from 
multiple systems to determine the most critical threat and 
prioritize actions. This is based on programming before 
deployment and updates to compatibility post-deployment 
as other AI systems are. deployed. This means these systems 
must be created to work with other systems from different 
branches of the military, meaning the programming would 
go through joint requirements. 
iv. Engineering Life Cycle Phases: Designing the AI systems 
to communicate with each other across joint platforms would 
occur in the Pre-Deployment phase (CR). A conscious effort 
to update all communication systems would be a task for the 
system administrators during Post-Deployment (OS). 
The Risk Mitigation Matrix in Table 23 summarizes the risk level of each failure 
mode, the risk mitigations/recommendations and which part of the engineering life cycle 
risk addressed is impacted. 
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Table 23. Risk Mitigation Matrix – Scenario 3 






Hostile Threat Not Addressed – Strategic AI BMA Failure 




High -Programming to adjust to 
and work with other AI 
BMA systems 
-Updates to compatibility 





Moderate -Response time standards 
-Capable of processing 
multiple recommendations 
CR, PD, SDD 
Hostile Threat Not Addressed - Tactical BMA Failure 
Mistrust in AI 
recommendation 
Moderate -Capable of processing 
multiple recommendations 
to prioritize 












Moderate -Real-time communication CR, TD, PD, OS 





High -Algorithms in place to 
accommodate multiple 
recommendations 
TD, PD, OS 
 
Hostile Threat Not Neutralized - Tactical BMA Failure 
Ineffective forces 
chose to address 
threats 
High -Algorithms in place to 
accommodate multiple 
recommendations 
TD, PD, OS 
 
To assess the overall risk, all risks were considered, and the average was 
determined. For this scenario, the Overall risk is High. In Scenario 3 - Strategic vs. Theater 
Bias the failure modes with the highest risks are 3.a., Ineffective assignment of forces 
recommended and 4.a., Ineffective forces chose to address threat. The failure mode with 
the lowest risk was 1.b., Untimely update to recommendation with an overall risk of Low. 
Having the highest risks, failure modes 3.a and 4.a make it clear the importance of the 
development and design phase of the AI BMA. If these systems are going to work with 
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other AI BMAs throughout the DOD, they must be programmed for compatibility and 
interoperability. In Scenario 3, much of the risk can be lessened with proper programming, 
joint efforts for compatibility and updates. 
C. RISK ANALYSIS TAKEAWAYS 
1. Overall Risk Levels Summary 
To summarize our risk analysis, the following tables show all failure modes 
organized by their risk level, from low to high risk. Organizing the results in this manner 
focuses on the highest risk failure modes for prioritization when developing AI BMAs. 
Table 24. Failure Modes with Overall Low Risk 
Failure Mode Risk Level 
Common System Hazards 
Natural Disaster Low 
Power Loss Low 
Out of Date System  Low 
Encryption Failure Low 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA Low 
Failure to provide timely recommendation Low 
Failure to update time sensitive recommendation Low 
Outdated CONOPS Low 
Scenario 2 – Ship Shelf Defense Training Data 




Table 25. Failure Modes with Overall Moderate Risk 
Failure Mode Risk Level 
Common System Hazards 
Network related adversarial attack Moderate 
System component failure Moderate 
User error/lack of knowledge  Moderate 
Weak access controls Moderate 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of countermeasure calculation Moderate 
Failure of misfire protocol/calculation Moderate 
Limited training Moderate 
Failure of impact calculation Moderate 
Failure of subsystem error detection Moderate 
CONOPS/Training Moderate 
Scenario 2 – Ship Shelf Defense Training Data 
Faulty base algorithms Moderate 
Outdated data on enemy tactics Moderate 
Training data spillage to enemy forces Moderate 
Prioritization of new data and training data Moderate 
Outdated data on enemy forces Moderate 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
Untimely update to recommendation Moderate 
Mistrust in AI recommendation Moderate 






Table 26. Failure Modes with Overall High Risk 
Failure Mode Risk Level 
Common System Hazards 
Corrupt/incorrect data High 
Insider threat High 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of time sensitive decision High 
Failure to provide timely recommendation High 
Conflicting recommendations High 
Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) High 
Failure of impact calculation High 
Failure to update time sensitive recommendation High 
Scenario 2 – Ship Shelf Defense Training Data 
Meaningless patterns used High 
Failure to provide timely engagement response High 
Ineffective engagement recommended High 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
AI unable to process non-concurrence (inflexible) High 
Insufficient protocol for nonconcurrence High 
Ineffective assignment of forces recommended High 
Ineffective forces chose to address threat High 
 
2. Risk Mitigation and Engineering Life Cycle Implementation Summary 
Through our analysis, we determined risk mitigations for our failure modes and 
were able to determine when in the systems engineering life cycle they should be addressed 
and implemented. The tables below organize the failure modes and their risk mitigations 
based on which phase of the engineering life cycle they fall under. These tables are in order 
of the engineering life cycle. 
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Table 27. Risk Mitigations for Failure Modes during the Concept 
Refinement (CR) Phase 
Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Common System Hazards 
Power loss -Uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 
User error/lack of knowledge or training -Standards 
Out of date system -Updating processes 
Insider threat -Processes for vetting, AUPs, audits and 
whitelisting 
Weak Access Controls -Standards 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of time sensitive decision -User training standards 
-CONOPS 
-Required reaction time 
Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML 
BMA 
-User training standards 
-CONOPS 
-Required reaction time 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Response time standards 
Conflicting recommendations -CONOPS 
Limited training -On boarding training process  
Delayed decision (conflicting 
recommendations) 
-Response time standards 
Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Failure to provide timely engagement 
response 
-Response time standards 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
Untimely update to recommendation -Response time standards 
Mistrust in AI recommendation -Capable of processing multiple 
recommendations to prioritize 







Table 28. Risk mitigations for Failure Modes during the Technology 
Development (TD) Phase 
Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Common System Hazards 
Weak access controls -Physical access protections 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML 
BMA 
-Response time timeout functionality 
Failure to provide timely recommendation -Response time timeout functionality 
Failure of misfire protocol/calculation -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure of subsystem error detection -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Delayed decision (conflicting 
recommendations) 
-Programming to implement response time 
standards 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Faulty base algorithms -Ensure proper algorithms used 
Training data spillage to enemy forces -Encryption 
-Firewall  
-Access restrictions 
Meaningless patterns used -Programming to use proper algorithms 
Prioritization of new data and training data -Programming to properly prioritize 
Ineffective engagement recommended -Programming to properly prioritize 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
AI unable to process non-concurrence 
(inflexible) 
-Programming to adjust and work with 
other AI BMA systems 
Mistrust in AI recommendation -Capable of processing multiple 
recommendations to prioritize 
Response not communicated to strategic 
AI BMA 
-Real-time communication 
Ineffective assignment of forces 
recommended 
-Algorithms in place to accommodate 
multiple recommendations 





Table 29. Risk Mitigations for Failure Modes during the System 
Development and Demonstration (SDD) Phase 
Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Common System Hazards 
Natural disaster -Alternate sites/Equipment 
Network related adversarial attack -Firewall protections 
-Network protections 
-Closed systems with no connection to the 
internet 
System component failure -Fault tolerance 
-Backup system components 
User error/lack of knowledge or training -Training system development 
-Automated process 




Encryption failure -Re-encryption 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Conflicting recommendations -Programming to ensure AI meets 
CONOPS 
Failure of countermeasure calculation -Programming to allow analysis of user 
input 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure of subsystem error detection -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Programming for the analysis of user 
input 
Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Outdated data on enemy tactics -Programming for enemy tactics 
information 
Failure to provide timely engagement 
response 
-Programming for response time 
Ineffective engagement recommended -Programming to properly prioritize 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
Untimely update to recommendation -Capable of processing multiple 
recommendations 




Table 30. Risk mitigations for Failure Modes during the Production 
and Development (PD) Phase 
Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Common System Hazards 
Power loss -Uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 
User error/lack of knowledge or training -Standards 
Out of date system -Updating processes 
Insider threat -Processes for vetting, AUPs, audits and 
whitelisting 
Weak Access Controls -Standards 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Conflicting recommendations -Programming to ensure AI meets 
CONOPS 
Failure of countermeasure calculation -Programming 
Failure of misfire protocol/calculation -Programming 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming 
Failure of subsystem error detection -Programming 
Failure of impact calculation -Programming 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Programming 
Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Training data spillage to enemy forces -Encryption 
-Firewall 
-Access restrictions 
Meaningless patterns used -Programming to use proper algorithms 
Prioritization of new data and training data -Programming to properly prioritize 
Ineffective engagement recommended -Programming of proper algorithms  
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
AI unable to process non-concurrence 
(inflexible) 
-Programming to adjust to and work with 
other AI BMA systems 
Untimely update to recommendation -Capable of processing multiple 
recommendation 
Mistrust in AI recommendation -Capable of processing multiple 
recommendations 
Response not communicated to strategic 
AI BMA 
-Real-time communication 
Ineffective assignment of forces 
recommended 
-Algorithms in place to accommodate 
multiple recommendations 




Table 31. Risk mitigations for Failure Modes during the Operations 
and Support (OS) Phase 
Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Common System Hazards 
Natural disaster -Alternate sites/equipment upkeep 
Power loss -Uninterruptable power supply (UPS) 
maintenance 
Network related adversarial attack -Firewall and network protections enabling 
Corrupt/incorrect data -Audits 
-Backups 
-Testing updates before implementation 
User error/lack of knowledge or training -Training  
Out of date system -Regular updates 
Insider threat -Vetting 
-AUP signing 
-Audits 
Weak access controls -Physical access protection 
Encryption failure -Re-encryption 
-Software updates 
Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile Defense 
Failure of time sensitive decision -User training 
-Updates to CONOPS 
Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML 
BMA 
-User training 
-Updates to CONOPS 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Regular updates and alerts 
Conflicting recommendations -Annual CONOPS updates 
Failure of countermeasure calculation -Updates to analysis 
Outdated CONOPS -Annual updates as required by the DOD 
Limited training -Performing on boarding training 
-Annual refresher training 
Failure of impact calculation -Updates to analysis 
Failure of subsystem error detection -Updates to analysis 
Delayed decision (conflicting 
recommendations) 
-User training 
CONOPS/Training -Annual updates 
-Annual refresher training 
Failure of impact calculation -Updates to analysis 
Failure to update time sensitive 
recommendation 
-Updates to analysis 
Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data 
Faulty base algorithms -Ensure most up to date algorithms used 
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Failure Mode Risk Mitigations for Engineering 
Lifecyle Phase 
Outdated data on enemy tactics -Updates monthly/as needed 
Training data spillage to enemy forces -Updates to encryption, firewall, access 
restrictions 
Meaningless patterns used -Updates to algorithms 
Overwriting/Loss of training data -Backups 
-Off loading 
Prioritization of new data and training data -Updates 
Outdated data on enemy forces -Updates monthly/as needed 
Ineffective engagement recommended -Updates 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias 
AI unable to process non-concurrence 
(inflexible) 
-Updates to compatibility 
Insufficient protocol for non-concurrence -Updates to algorithms 
Response not communicated to strategic 
AI BMA 
-Real-time communication 
Ineffective assignment of forces 
recommended 
-Updates to algorithms 
Ineffective forces chose to address threats -Updates to algorithms 
 
3. Overall Chapter Takeaways 
In summary, assessing the three scenarios shows that the risks associated with AI 
BMAs are high due to the short decision time, tactical nature of the system and that they 
would be used to protect lives and assets. The overall risk of Scenario 1 – Ballistic Missile 
Defense is Moderate, for Scenario 2 – Ship Self Defense Training Data is High and for 
Scenario 3 – Strategic vs. Theater Bias is High. Developing trust in AI systems is difficult 
since the DOD does not want to place the lives of the warfighter in the hands of an AI 
computer system.  
Artificial intelligence BMAs initially would only recommend the best response to 
an incoming threat, which will assist the war fighter in making a timely and informed 
decision. Based on the risk analysis performed, failure modes occurred because of common 
core software or training data quality issues, where risk can be decreased through various 
common and new mitigation means. These common issues included user training, policies 
and documentation, updates to the system and documentation, and the design, 
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programming and implementation of the AI system, especially consideration of training 
data sets. If risk mitigations are applied, AI BMAs are possible and will benefit the 
warfighter, but there are many steps that need to occur before this can happen. Appendix 
A associates the risk mitigations with the stages of the engineering process. Further study 
conclusions are addressed in Chapter V.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND PATH FORWARD 
This section captures the insights from the team’s research, summarizes the failure 
modes and risks found once AI is introduced into a battle management aid in an AAMD 
environment, and provides a path forward for future work for AI/ML in the DOD. All 
scenarios will be revisited to show the common failure modes that can be realized when 
integrating AI into BMA, especially when the warfighter interfaces with a console 
operating the systems. A final risk posture highlighting primary culprits of failure modes 
is provided to show where risks may arise in future systems. Our objectives are re-visited 
and our approach for analysis discussed to show how the team arrived at our failure modes 
and risks. Finally, this section offers the potential benefit of this study for future use in the 
DOD acquisition process.  
A. CONCLUSIONS 
According to various sources of open-source media, three typical concerns stand 
out when implementing artificial intelligence and machine learning into systems that have 
an operator in the loop. Each of the scenarios had a unique issue that put the AAMD 
mission at risk. Scenario 1 drew out the associated risks with trusting artificial intelligence 
on the battlefield. Scenario 2 explored reporting errors due to bad training data. Scenario 3 
looked at risks as it related to conflicting decisions by two competing AI/ML BMA 
systems. They are: 
• Warfighter Trust Deficit 
• Training Data 
• Bias  
The first is general trust of the system with AI/ML present and is the subject of our 
first use case scenario. According to Galliott (2018), there is a level of too much trust and 
too little trust. Galliott describes the encounter of the USS Vincennes (CG-49) during the 
Persian Gulf War. The Vincennes was equipped with the latest Aegis Combat System 
(ACS). It was engaged by small boats while on patrol. During the fight, the system did not 
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identify an aircraft as a civilian airliner. The ACS categorized the airliner as an enemy 
fighter aircraft and engaged it as a hostile threat, killing all on board. According to Galliott, 
“Post-accident reporting and analysis discovered that overconfidence in the abilities of the 
system, coupled with a poor human-machine interface, prevented those aboard the ship 
from intervening to avoid the tragedy” (Galliott 2018, 128).  
Scenario 1 focused on warfighter trust deficit when defending the United States 
against an incoming ballistic missile using the Ground Base Midcourse Defense system. 
We highlighted the possibility of conflicting employment guidance for the weapon system. 
While warfighters are trained on their CONOPs, the AI/ML recommendation might arrive 
at a different solution. We found that this conflicting guidance is at a medium likelihood 
of occurrence with a minor impact to the mission. However, like the incident with the 
Vincennes, the operator can possess an overreliance on the system and miss key inputs that 
would otherwise lead to the correct course of action in an engagement. General trust in the 
system can be viewed as having too little confidence as well. Not having the WF trust the 
system enough or building enough confidence in it would hinder employment of a battle 
management aid that uses AI/ML. 
When it is successfully demonstrated in live fire events, AI/ML inspires and builds 
confidence. Recently, the Army tested a simple architecture using overhead sensors, an 
airborne platform, artillery and targets. Project Convergence was executed out of Yuma 
Proving Grounds by Army Futures Command in September 2020 demonstrating that AI/
ML contributed to increased identification, detection, tracking and destruction of incoming 
aerial threats with a success rate of 98% (Cox 2020).  
The second scenario analyzed by the team examined the misidentification of a 
threat due to inappropriate training data. The destroyer had observed various swarms of 
UAV/UAS in the vicinity of the ship. The ship observed non-hostile swarms and used the 
observation as input to the AI/ML. When the swarm became hostile, the AI/ML BMA did 
not recognize the threat. At a high level, the team assessed the risk of poor training data as 
medium likelihood with a severe impact.  
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Training data is used to “teach” machine learning or artificial intelligence to 
achieve a desired level of operational confidence. Algorithms will learn from the data 
provided. From this data, the AI/ML code will learn patterns and develop decisions. The 
adage “garbage in, garbage out” is applicable to this risk in that if poor data is provided to 
the algorithms, such as dated threat information, the AI/ML would not provide the best 
decision space to the operator. 
Concept drift or a shift in machine learning’s goal during its life cycle is applicable 
in this scenario. Many articles exist that discuss concept drift, or dataset shift. According 
to machinelearningmastery.com, “Concept drift in machine learning and data mining refers 
to the change in the relationships between input and output data in the underlying problem 
over time” (Brownlee 2017) This can have severe consequences on a battlefield. A 
gradually changing set of code within a ML system must be monitored in order to mitigate 
risk. As an example, ML could inform the BMA that a threat is within a known adversarial 
test or demonstration range. While the ML has properly identified the threats that are 
airborne, it may not recognize that the threat can come from that area and improperly 
categorize the threat as something that poses danger to a defended area. 
The third scenario explored a tactical versus strategic/operational interface for 
BMA. At a strategic/operational level, policies are set in place to direct order of battle 
elements or ensure pre-planned responses are met. Resources are identified and courses of 
actions are written to define the missions for air superiority, cyberspace superiority, and 
space superiority (Department of the Air Force 2015). There is ‘left of launch’ planning 
involved that helps senior leaders understand posturing. At a tactical level the individual 
battles and engagements are fought. In this scenario, systems that had the responsibility to 
defend a specific location received notification that an inbound threat was entering their 
area of responsibility. At the strategic level, AI/ML made recommendations based on 
operational considerations. However, strategic AI/ML provided the warfighter with input 
specific to the systems defending the airfield. Not all considerations were made at the 
tactical level and the AI/ML arrived at the option that best served the strategic level. The 
bias demonstrated in this scenario is a real possibility with multiple systems using AI/ML. 
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While the consequences of this are serious, the team assessed the probability of occurrence 
as low.  
The team assessed three fundamental issues that pose risks using AL/ML in a BMA 
system. These risks are at the root of the scenarios analyzed in Chapters III and IV and 
shown in Table 32. We looked at how potential warfighters’ trust deficit can impact real 
world operations. From a technical perspective, use of AI/ML can increase decision space 
and better inform the warfighter. However, trust in AI/ML may drive the warfighter to use 
existing CONOPs and TTPs. Overreliance can lead to detrimental losses. We’ve assessed 
that AI/ML Warfighter Trust Deficit as a 2 x 4 risk (medium-low probability with severe 
consequences) mitigated through rigorous validation and verification (V&V) and training.  
As part of the development of an AI/ML BMA, training data will be required so 
that the system can learn what it is intended for. As mentioned previously, bad training 
data will lead to bad results. We assess the risk of poor training data as a 3 x 4 (medium 
likelihood with severe consequences) mitigated through continuous monitoring and 
evaluation of the system. 
Finally, bias and focus drift are a risk to battle management aids that will use AI/
ML. As highlighted in our research, AI/ML may not consider a full decision tree if it arrives 
at a satisfactory conclusion, removing options to the warfighter that may better suit the 
situation. We assess bias and focus drift as a 4 x 4 (medium-high likelihood with severe 
consequences) mitigated through continuous monitoring of output and extensive use in 








Table 32. Final Risk Posture 
Severity           
5         
4        R3   
3       R2   
2       R1   
1         
  1 2 3 4 5 
  Probability of Occurrence 
R1 Warfighter Trust (Scenario 1) 
R2 Training Data (Scenario 2) 
R3 Bias / Focus Drift (Scenario 3) 
 
Most risks identified in Chapter IV can be mitigated during the Pre-Deployment 
phase of development for a BMA system. Any Post-Deployment risks that are realized will 
likely take substantial work to mitigate. As in a software intensive program office, a robust 
V&V process should be implemented in order to validate that the BMA does not realize 
any of these risks listed above. An extensive continuous development and continuous 
delivery approach should be used in order to keep pace with the amount of training data 
required for AI/ML in BMA for an AAMD mission. Continuous monitoring of BMA 
systems at any level will be needed once operationally deployed to look for failure modes 
and ensure risk mitigations are in place.  
On the subject of policy, the Department of Defense published DOD Directive 
3000.09 that provides initial guidance on development and use of autonomous and semi-
autonomous weapon systems. It sets the standard on application of lethal or non-lethal 
force by autonomous systems. The policy states “4.a. Autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapon systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force” (Department of Defense 
2017). The directive goes on to instruct services that before a system is deployed, it must 
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demonstrate the capability to allow commander and operators to exercise appropriate levels 
of human judgement before force is applied. The operational scenario involving an Aegis 
ship under attack by a fighter with pilots is an example where a fully autonomous system 
driven by AI/ML could violate policy. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS 
The team set out to address the safety risks related to the development and 
implementation of future BMA that use AI/ML as part of the tactical software. All phases 
of the acquisition cycle were considered, along with known relevant employment of 
currently fielded systems. The following will review the goals of this report and the 
approach the systems engineering team took to achieve them.  
1. What are the safety risks related to the deployment of AI systems that 
support future automated tactical decision and mission planning aids? 
Our approach began by developing a generic kill chain that can be applied to 
AAMD systems. The team created an Innoslate model that captured functions and the 
decomposed subfunctions to map out where possible failure modes may be present. 
Through our literature review, we looked at issues that the community was facing with the 
use of AI/ML in DOD and industry systems. To further explore and draw out potential 
failure modes, the team developed three unique scenarios meant to provide the environment 
where a failure could be realized. An Operational View –1 was generated to visualize the 
AI/ML in BMA systems in the context of a real world setting and then used to generate a 
set of use cases. A second OV-1 was generated depicting a tactical scenario where a local 
operator relied on the onboard AI/ML BMA system. Scenario 1 looked at possible mistrust 
of a BMA using AI/ML in the tactical software. Scenario 2 explored a lone ship not 
understanding what it is observing as a swarm of otherwise harmless UAVs approach the 
destroyer. Scenario 3 looked at contributing factors to conflicting guidance from AI/ML 
systems at an operational level vs its tactical counterpart.  
Table 33 is a summary roll up of failure modes the team identified across the 




Table 33. Scenario Failure Mode Comparison 
Failure Mode 





























































Outdated CONOPs X         X     1 
Incorrect CONOPs/
Training X         X     1 
AI failure to provide 
timely 
recommendation 
X         X   X 1 
AI failure of 
subsystem error 
detection 
X         X     1 
AI failure to provide 
timely engagement 
response 
X         X X X 2 




X         X     3 
Untimely update to 
Strategic AI 
recommendation 
X         X   X 3 
Conflicting 
recommendations X X       X     1 
AI failure to update 
time sensitive 
recommendation 
X X       X   X 1 
AI failure of misfire 
protocol/calculation X X     X X   X 1 
Overwriting/Loss of 
AI/ML training data 
X X     X X     2 
Prioritization of new 
data and training data 
for AI/ML 
X X     X X     2 
WF delayed decision 
(conflicting 
recommendations) 

































































WF failure of timely 
protocols with AI/ML 
BMA 
X     X   X     1 
Limited training X     X   X     1 
Mistrust in Strategic 
AI BMA 
recommendation 
X     X   X     3 
Insufficient protocol 
for non-concurrence 
from Tactical AI/C2 
X     X   X X   3 
Tactical C2 response 
to threat not 
communicated to 
Strategic AI BMA 
X     X   X     3 
Tactical C2 choses 
ineffective forces to 
address threat 
X     X   X X   3 
AI failure of 
countermeasure 
calculation 
  X       X     1 
AI failure of impact 
calculation   X       X X   1 
Faulty base 
algorithms for AI   X       X     2 
Outdated data on 
enemy tactics 
  X     X X     2 
Meaningless patterns 
used for AI/ML   X     X X     2 
Ineffective 
engagement 
recommended by AI 




assignment of forces 

































































Training data spillage 
to enemy forces 
  X X   X X     2 
Outdated data on 
enemy forces 
(weapon impact) 
  X X     X     2 
WF failure of time 
sensitive decision       X   X     1 
 
2. What are the possible consequences of safety related problems in AI systems 
used in tactical decision making? 
By using the Risk Analysis Framework, the team determined that there are many 
possible consequences including loss of life, loss of assets, compromised systems and 
information, untrained personnel, out-of-date system information, physical security risks, 
and more. It was determined that Scenario 1 had an overall risk of Moderate, while 
Scenarios 2 and 3 had an overall risk of High. The safety related problems were all analyzed 
as worst-case scenarios based on the likelihood and the impact of occurrence. An important 
finding within our research was that these risks can be reduced or mitigated through 
conscious efforts to ensure quality research, data, design, programming, documentation, 
operational support and sustainment is implemented throughout the engineering life cycle. 
Security protections that help to mitigate the risks found in this study are summarized in 
Appendix A, and the phase of the engineering life cycle that they should be implemented 
are summarized in Appendix B. The team highly recommends that these protections are 
considered and implemented when AI BMAs are being developed. Through the 
implementation of security protections, consequences will be less likely and less severe.  
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C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
As threats change and our systems roll off the assembly line, understanding risks 
and failure modes associated with artificial intelligence early in the program life cycle is 
critical to fielding an effective system. The AAMD domain will only increase as 
adversarial weapons looking to saturate sensors or overwhelm defense systems. Ensuring 
that we can match or outpace the threat should be the focus of the program offices once 
AAMD systems are fielded. It is important to address these risks and failure modes early 
in a life cycle to maximize focus on how to defeat the merging threats. Any system or BMA 
programs that realize the risks identified in this report after the system is fielded will see 
an increase in performance risk. This report will reduce overall program risk (cost, schedule 
and performance) to BMA programs that will incorporate AI/ML into tactical code if 
considered early in a program life cycle. 
D. PATH FORWARD 
Having identified an initial risk posture of AI/ML in BMA systems, the team 
strongly recommends investigating how AI/ML will be used in BMA systems. 
Understanding the specific and intended uses will help mitigate risks associated with biases 
and will foster system confidence. 
(1) Implementation of AI/ML at a Tactical Level vs. Operational Level  
The team recommends a study on how to best implement AI/ML in the command 
structure. As AI/ML is introduced to various systems, how an engagement is consummated 
is very important. The engagement decision tree could be executed at an operational level 
however, not all information may be considered or available at the operational level.  
(2) Use of AI/ML to Gather Data on Threats  
Another recommendation is to perform a study on the potential use of AI/ML to 
gather performance data on existing or new threats. This study should compare AI/ML data 
collected versus intelligence community findings. The study should look at how AI/ML 
can contribute to defense design planning based on new threats, or changes in adversarial 
use of existing threats.  
 
123 
(3) Verification and Validation of AI/ML Intensive Systems 
The team recommends a DOD level directive on how V&V will be managed and 
implemented for systems that will use AI/ML. This directive should include continuous 
monitoring of AI/ML software and testing of new code.  
(4) Reliability for AI/ML Intensive Programs 
The team recommends a service level and DOD level reliability study for AI/ML 
battle management aids. This study should address effectiveness of information used by 








This Appendix summarizes the risk mitigations that must be implemented when 
building an AI BMA system. Risk Mitigations are organized based on how many risks they 
would negate/lessen and then alphabetically.  
 
Most Common Mitigations and when to implement in the Engineering Life cycle 
 




-Failure of countermeasure 
calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/
calculation 
-Failure of impact 
calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error 
detection 
-Failure of impact 
calculation 
-Failure to update time 
sensitive recommendation 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Meaningless patterns used 
-Prioritization of new data 
and training data 
-Ineffective engagement 
recommended 
-AI unable to process non-
concurrence 
-Untimely update to 
recommendation 
-Mistrust in AI 
recommendation 
-Insufficient protocol for 
non-concurrence 
-Response not 





System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)  
 
Production and 




Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated Engineering Life Cycle 
Stages 
-Ineffective assignment of 
forces recommended 
-Ineffective forces chose to 
address threats 
Standards/Documentation 
(including the updates) 
-User error/lack of 
knowledge 
-Weak access controls 
-Failure of time sensitive 
decision 
-Failure of timely protocols 
with AI/ML BMA 
-Failure to provide timely 
recommendation 









-Failure to provide timely 
engagement response 
-Untimely update to 
recommendation 
Concept Refinement (CR)  
 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Updates -Out of date system 
-Encryption failure 
-Failure to update time 
sensitive recommendation 
-CONOPS/Training 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Outdated data on enemy 
tactics 
-Outdated data on enemy 
forces 
-AI unable to process non-
concurrence 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Allowing analysis of user 
input 
-Failure of countermeasure 
calculation 





System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)  
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated Engineering Life Cycle 
Stages 
-Failure of impact 
calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error 
detection 
-Failure of impact 
calculation 




Development (PD)   
Training (including annual 
refresher training) 
-User error/lack of 
knowledge 
-Failure of time sensitive 
decision 
-Failure of timely protocols 






Concept Refinement (CR)  
 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Personnel Vetting -Insider threat 
-Limited training 
-Training data spillage to 
enemy forces 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Audits -Corrupt/incorrect data 
-Insider threat 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Backups -Corrupt/incorrect data 
-Overwriting/loss of 
training data 
Operations and Support 









System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)  
Production and 
Development (PD)  
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Acceptable Use Policy -Insider threat Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Alternate sites/Equipment Natural disaster  Concept Refinement (CR)  
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Automated Processes -User error/lack of 
knowledge 
System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD)   
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated Engineering Life Cycle 
Stages 
Backup Components -System component failure Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Encryption -Training data spillage to 
enemy forces 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Fault Tolerance -System component failure Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Offloading information 
onto backup system 
-Training data spillage to 
enemy forces 
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Physical access protections -Weak access controls Concept Refinement (CR)  
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Re-encryption -Encryption failure Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Testing before 
implementation 
-Corrupt/incorrect data Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Uninterruptable power 
supply (UPS)  
-Power loss Concept Refinement (CR)  
Production and 
Development (PD)  
Operations and Support 
(OS)   
Whitelisting -Insider threat Concept Refinement (CR)  







This Appendix summarizes the risk mitigations that must be implemented when 
building an AI BMA system. Risk Mitigations are organized based on how many risks they 
would negate/lessen.  
 
Most Common Mitigations in Concept Refinement Phase 
 
Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Standards/Documentation 
(including the updates) 
-User error/lack of knowledge 
-Weak access controls 
-Failure of time sensitive decision 
-Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA 
-Failure to provide timely recommendation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-Conflicting recommendations 
-Outdated CONOPS 
-Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) 
-CONOPS Training 
-Failure to provide timely engagement response 
-Untimely update to recommendation 
Training (including annual 
refresher training) 
-User error/lack of knowledge 
-Failure of time sensitive decision 
-Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA 
-Limited training 
-Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) 
-CONOPS/Training 
Alternate sites/Equipment -Natural disaster  
Physical access protections -Weak access controls 
Uninterruptable power supply 
(UPS)  
-Power loss 
Whitelisting -Insider threat 
 
Most Common Mitigations in Technology Development Phase 
 
Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Programming -Conflicting recommendations 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Meaningless patterns used 
-Prioritization of new data and training data 
-Ineffective engagement recommended 
-AI unable to process non-concurrence 
-Untimely update to recommendation 
-Mistrust in AI recommendation 
-Insufficient protocol for non-concurrence 
-Response not communicated to strategic AI BMA 
-Ineffective assignment of forces recommended 
-Ineffective forces chose to address threats 
Allowing analysis of user 
input 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
Firewall protections/
Network protections 
-Network related adversarial attack 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
 
Most Common Mitigations in System Development and Demonstration Phase 
 
Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Programming -Conflicting recommendations 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Meaningless patterns used 
-Prioritization of new data and training data 
-Ineffective engagement recommended 
-AI unable to process non-concurrence 
-Untimely update to recommendation 
-Mistrust in AI recommendation 
-Insufficient protocol for non-concurrence 
-Response not communicated to strategic AI BMA 
-Ineffective assignment of forces recommended 
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
-Ineffective forces chose to address threats 
Allowing analysis of user 
input 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
Firewall protections/
Network protections 
-Network related adversarial attack 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
Automated Processes -User error/lack of knowledge 
Whitelisting -Insider threat 
 
Most Common Mitigations in Production and Deployment Phase 
 
Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Programming -Conflicting recommendations 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Meaningless patterns used 
-Prioritization of new data and training data 
-Ineffective engagement recommended 
-AI unable to process non-concurrence 
-Untimely update to recommendation 
-Mistrust in AI recommendation 
-Insufficient protocol for non-concurrence 
-Response not communicated to strategic AI BMA 
-Ineffective assignment of forces recommended 
-Ineffective forces chose to address threats 
Allowing analysis of user 
input 
-Failure of countermeasure calculation 
-Failure of misfire protocol/calculation 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure of subsystem error detection 
-Failure of impact calculation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
Firewall protections/
Network protections 
-Network related adversarial attack 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Uninterruptable power 
supply (UPS)  
-Power loss 
 
Most Common Mitigations in Operations and Support Phase 
 
Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Standards/Documentation 
(including the updates) 
-User error/lack of knowledge 
-Weak access controls 
-Failure of time sensitive decision 
-Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA 
-Failure to provide timely recommendation 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-Conflicting recommendations 
-Outdated CONOPS 
-Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) 
-CONOPS Training 
-Failure to provide timely engagement response 
-Untimely update to recommendation 
Updates -Out of date system 
-Encryption failure 
-Failure to update time sensitive recommendation 
-CONOPS/Training 
-Faulty base algorithms 
-Outdated data on enemy tactics 
-Outdated data on enemy forces 
-AI unable to process non-concurrence 
Training (including annual 
refresher training) 
-User error/lack of knowledge 
-Failure of time sensitive decision 
-Failure of timely protocols with AI/ML BMA 
-Limited training 
-Delayed decision (conflicting recommendations) 
-CONOPS/Training 
Personnel Vetting -Insider threat 
-Limited training 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
Audits -Corrupt/incorrect data 
-Insider threat 
Backups -Corrupt/incorrect data 
-Overwriting/loss of training data 
Firewall protections/
Network protections 
-Network related adversarial attack 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
Acceptable Use Policy -Insider threat 
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Risk Mitigations Risks Mitigated 
Alternate sites/Equipment Natural disaster  
Backup Components -System component failure 
Encryption -Training data spillage to enemy forces 
Fault Tolerance -System component failure 
Offloading information 
onto backup system 
-Training data spillage to enemy forces 
Physical access protections -Weak access controls 





supply (UPS)  
-Power loss 
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